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Abstract This paper examines the rationality and diversity of industry-level forecasts of
the yen-dollar exchange rate collected by the Japan Center for International Finance. In
several ways we update and extend the seminal work by Ito (1990). We compare three
speciﬁcations for testing rationality: the ”conventional” bivariate regression, the univariate
regression of a forecast error on a constant and other information set variables, and an error
correction model (ECM). We ﬁnd that the bivariate speciﬁcation, while producing consistent
estimates, suﬀers from two defects: ﬁrst, the conventional restrictions are suﬃcient but not
necessary for unbiasedness; second, the test has low power. However, before we can apply
the univariate speciﬁcation, we must conduct pretests for the stationarity of the forecast
error. We ﬁnd a unit root in the six-month horizon forecast error for all groups, thereby
rejecting unbiasedness and weak eﬃciency at the pretest stage. For the other two horizons,
we ﬁnd much evidence in favor of unbiasedness but not weak eﬃciency. Our ECM rejects
unbiasedness for all forecasters at all horizons. We conjecture that these results, too, occur
because the restrictions test suﬃciency, not necessity. In our systems estimation and micro-
homogeneity testing, we use an innovative GMM technique (Bonham and Cohen (2001))
that allows for forecaster cross-correlation due to the existence of common shocks and/or
herd eﬀects. Tests of micro-homogeneity uniformly reject the hypothesis that forecasters
across the four industries exhibit similar rationality characteristics.
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This paper examines the rationality of industry-level survey forecasts of the yen-dollar
exchange rate collected by the Japan Center for International Finance (JCIF). Tests of
rationality take on additional signiﬁcance when performed on asset market prices, since
rational expectations is a necessary condition for market eﬃciency. In the foreign exchange
market, tests of forward rate unbiasedness simultaneously test a zero risk premium in the
exchange rate; hence this joint hypothesis is also called the risk-neutral eﬃcient market
hypothesis (RNEMH). The practical signiﬁcance of such a hypothesis is that, if the forward
rate is indeed an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate, then exchange risk can be
costlessly hedged in the forward market. However, the RNEMH has been rejected nearly
universally. Since the risk premium is unobservable, insight into the reason for the rejection
of the RNEMH can be gained by separately testing for rationality using survey data on
expectations. Because forecasters cannot be assumed to have identical information sets, we
must use individual survey forecasts to avoid the aggregation bias inherent in the use of
mean or median forecasts.
We use data from the same source as Ito (1990), the seminal study recognizing the im-
portance of using individual data to test rationality hypotheses about the exchange rate.
To achieve stationarity of the realizations and forecasts (which each have a unit root), Ito
(1990) followed the conventional speciﬁcation at the time of subtracting the current real-
ization from each. These variables are then referred to as being in “return” form. To test
unbiasedness he regressed the future rate of depreciation on the forecasted return and tested
the joint restrictions that the intercept equalled zero and the slope coeﬃcient equalled one.
At the industry level he found approximately twice as many rejections (at the 1% level) at
the longest horizon (six months) than at the two shorter horizons (one and three months).
We extend Ito’s analysis in two principal respects: the speciﬁcation of unbiasedness tests
and inference in tests for micro-homogeneity of forecasters. One problem with the returns
speciﬁcation is that, since there is much more variation in the return on the realization than
1in the forecast, there is a tendency to under-reject the part of the joint hypothesis that the
coeﬃcient on the forecast equals one. This is precisely what we would expect in tests of
variables which are near random walks.
Second, and more fundamentally, Ito’s (1990) bivariate (joint) regression test of un-
biasedness is actually a test of suﬃciency, not necessity as well as suﬃciency. Following
Holden and Peel (1990), the necessary and suﬃcient condition for unbiasedness is a mean
zero forecast error. This is tested in a univariate regression by imposing a coeﬃcient of unity
on the forecast and testing the restriction that the intercept equals zero. This critique applies
whether or not the forecast and realization are integrated in levels. However, when the real-
ization and forecast are integrated in levels, we must conduct a pretest to determine whether
the forecast error is stationary. If the forecast and realization are both integrated and cointe-
grated, then a necessary and suﬃcient condition for unbiasedness is that intercept and slope
in the cointegrating regression (using levels of the realization and forecast) are zero and one,
respectively. We test this hypothesis using Liu and Maddala’s (1992) method of imposing
the (0,1) vector, then testing the “restricted” cointegrating residual for stationarity.1,2
Third, we use the result from Engle and Granger (1987) that cointegrated variables have
an error correction representation. First, we employ the speciﬁcation and unbiasedness
restrictions originally proposed by Hakkio and Rush (1989). However, the unbiasedness tests
using the ECM speciﬁcation produce more rejections over industry groups and horizons than
the univariate or bivariate speciﬁcations. We conjecture that one possible explanation for
this apparent anomaly is that, similar to the joint restrictions in the bivariate test, the ECM
restrictions test suﬃcient conditions for unbiasedness, while the univariate restriction only
tests a necessary and suﬃcient condition. Thus, the ECM has a tendency to over-reject. We
then respecify the ECM, so that only the necessary and suﬃcient conditions are tested. We
1If in addition the residuals from the cointegrating regression are white noise, this supports a type of
weak eﬃciency.
2Pretesting the forecast error for stationarity is a common practice in testing the RNMEH, but the only
study we know of that applies this practice to survey forecasts of exchange rates is Osterberg (2000), and he
does not test for a zero intercept in the cointegrating regression.
2compare our results to those obtained using the suﬃcient conditions represented by the joint
restrictions as well as the necessary and suﬃcient condition represented by the univariate
restriction.
The second direction in which we extend Ito’s (1990) analysis has to do with testing for
diﬀerences among forecasters’ ability to produce rational predictions.3 We recognize, as does
Ito, that diﬀerences among forecasters over time indicate that at least some individuals form
biased forecasts. (The converse does not necessarily hold, since a failure to reject micro-
homogeneity could conceivably be due to the same degree of irrationality of each individual
in the panel.) Ito’s heterogeneity test is a single equation test of deviations of individual
forecasts from the mean forecast, where the latter may or may not be unbiased. In contrast,
we test for diﬀerences in individual forecast performance using a micro-homogeneity test, i.e.,
imposing equal coeﬃcients across the system of individual univariate rationality equations.
In our tests for micro-homogeneity, we expect cross-forecaster error correlation due to
the possibility of common macro shocks and/or herd eﬀects in expectations. To this end,
we incorporate two innovations not previously used by investigators studying survey data on
exchange rate expectations. First, in our micro-homogeneity tests we use a GMM system
with a variance-covariance matrix that allows for cross-sectional as well as moving average
and heteroscedastic errors. Here we follow the widely-used practice of modeling the indi-
vidual regression residuals as an MA process of order h-1, where h is the number of periods
in the forecast horizon. However, no other researchers have actually tested whether an MA
process of this length is required to model the cross-sectional behavior of rational forecast
errors. Thus, second, to investigate the nature of the actual MA processes, we use Pesaran’s
(2004) CD test to examine the statistical signiﬁcance of the cross-sectional dependence of
forecast errors, both contemporaneous and lagged.
3Market microstructure theories assume that there is a minimum amount of forecaster (as well as cross-
sectional forecast) diversity. Also, theories of exchange rate determination that depend upon the interaction
between chartists (or noise traders) and fundamentalists by deﬁnition require a certain structure of forecaster
heterogeneity.
3The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we review some
fundamental issues in testing rationality in the foreign exchange market. In sections 3 and
4 we conduct various rationality tests on the JCIF data. Section 5 contains our micro-
homogeneity tests. Section 6 summarizes and discusses areas for future research.
2 Background: testing rationality in the foreign exchange market
The Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH) assumes that economic agents know the
true data generating process (DGP) for the forecast variable. This implies that the market’s
subjective probability distribution of the variable is identical to the objective probability
distribution, conditional on a given information set, Φt. Equating ﬁrst moments of the
market, Em(st+h|Φt), and objective, E(st+h|Φt), distributions,
Em(st+h|Φt) = E(st+h|Φt), (1)
where the right-hand-side can be shortened to Et(st+h).
It follows that the REH implies that forecast errors have both unconditional and condi-
tional means equal to zero. A forecast is unbiased if its forecast error has an unconditional
mean of zero. A forecast is eﬃcient if its error has a conditional mean of zero. The condition
that forecast errors be serially uncorrelated is a subset of the eﬃciency condition where the
conditioning information set consists of past values of the realization and current as well as
past values of the forecast.4
In this paper we focus on testing whether forecasters can form rational expectations of
future depreciation. If not, then at least part of the explanation for the failure of the RNEMH
is due to the failure of the REH. There are two related interest parity conditions. Covered
interest parity, an arbitrage condition, holds if ft,h − st = it − i∗
t, i.e., the forward premium
is equal to the interest diﬀerential between domestic and foreign risk free assets. Uncovered
interest parity holds if st+h − se
t = it − i∗
t. Because uncovered interest parity assumes both
4It is important to note that the result from one type of rationality test does not have implications for the
results from any other types of rationality tests. In this paper we test for unbiasedness and weak eﬃciency,
leaving the more stringent tests of eﬃciency with respect to publicly available information for future analysis.
4unbiased expectations and risk neutrality, some authors view it as equivalent to the RNEMH
(see Phillips and Maynard (2001)).
The ability to decompose deviations from UIP into time-varying risk premium and sys-
tematic forecast error components also has implications for policymakers. Consider ﬁrst the
possibility of a violation of the risk neutrality hypothesis. According to the portfolio balance
model, if a statistically signiﬁcant time-varying risk premium component is found, this means
that it − i∗
t is time-varying, which in turn implies that foreign and domestic bonds are not
perfect substitutes; changes in relative quantities (which are reﬂected in changes in current
account balances) will aﬀect the interest rate diﬀerential. In this way, sterilized oﬃcial inter-
vention can have signiﬁcant eﬀects on exchange rates. Second, consider the the possibility of
a violation of the REH. If a statistically signiﬁcant expectational error of the destabilizing
(e.g., “bandwagon”) type is found, and policymakers are more rational than speculators, a
policy of “leaning against the wind” could have a stabilizing eﬀect on exchange rate move-
ments. (See Cavaglia et al. 1994.) More generally, monetary models of the exchange rate
(in which the UIP condition is embedded), which assume model-consistent (i.e., rational)
expectations with risk-neutrality, generally have not performed well empirically, especially
in out-of-sample forecasting. (See, e.g., Bryant 1995.) One would like to be able to attribute
the model failure to some combination of a failure of the structural assumptions (including
risk neutrality) or a failure of the expectational assumption.
2.1 Why test rational expectations with disaggregated survey forecast data?
Beginning with Frankel and Froot (1987) and Froot and Frankel (1989), much of the lit-
erature examining exchange rate rationality in general, and the decomposition of deviations
from the RNEMH in particular, has employed the representative agent assumption to jus-
tify using the mean or median survey forecast as a proxy for the market’s expectation. In
both studies, Frankel and Froot found signiﬁcant evidence of irrationality. Subsequent re-
search has found mixed results. Liu and Maddala (1992, p. 366) articulate the mainstream
justiﬁcation for using aggregated forecasts in tests of the REH. “Although ...data on indi-
5viduals are important to throw light on how expectations are formed at the individual level,
to analyze issues relating to market eﬃciency, one has to resort to aggregates.” In fact,
Muth’s (1961)[p. 316] original deﬁnition of rational expectations seemed to allow for the
possibility that rationality could be applied to an aggregate (e.g., mean or median) forecast.
“...[E]xpectations of ﬁrms (or, more generally, the subjective probability distribution of
outcomes) tend to be distributed, for the same information set, about the predictions of the
theory (or the ’objective’ probability distribution of outcomes.)” (Emphasis added.)
However, if individual forecasters have diﬀerent information sets, Muth’s deﬁnition does
not apply. To take the simplest example, the (current) mean forecast is not in any fore-
caster’s information set, since all individuals’ forecasts must be made before a mean can be
calculated. Thus, current mean forecasts contain private information (see MacDonald, 1992)
and therefore cannot be tested for rationality.5
Using the mean forecast may also result in inconsistent parameter estimates. Figlewski
and Wachtel (1983) were the ﬁrst to show that, in the traditional bivariate unbiasedness
equation, the presence of private information variables in the mean forecast error sets up a
correlation with the mean forecast. This inconsistency occurs even if all individual forecasts
are rational. In addition, Keane and Runkle (1990) pointed out that, when some forecasters
are irrational, using the mean forecast may lead to false acceptance of the unbiasedness
hypothesis, in the unlikely event that oﬀsetting individual biases allow parameters to be
consistently estimated. See also Bonham and Cohen (2001), who argue that, in the case of
cointegrated targets and predictions, inconsistency of estimates in rationality tests using the
mean forecast can be avoided if corresponding coeﬃcients in the individual rationality tests
5A large theoretical literature relaxes Muth’s assumption that all information relevant for forming a ratio-
nal forecast is publicly available. Instead, this literature examines how heterogeneous individual expectations
are mapped into an aggregate market expectation, and whether the latter leads to market eﬃciency. (See,
e.g., Figlewski 1978, 1982, 1984; Kirman 1992; Haltiwanger and Waldman 1989.) Our paper focuses on indi-
vidual rationality but allows for the possibility of synergism by incorporating not only heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent standard errors in individual rationality tests but also cross-forecaster correlation
in tests of micro-homogeneity. The extreme informational requirement of the REH lead Pesaran and Weale
(2006 (forthcoming)) to propose a weaker form of the REH that is based on the (weighted) average expec-
tation using only publicly available (i.e., common) information.
6pass a test for micro-homogeneity.6 Nevertheless, until the 1990s, few researchers tested for
the rationality of individual forecasts, even when those data were available.
2.2 Rational reasons for the failure of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis using disag-
gregated data
Other than a failure to process available information eﬃciently, there are numerous ex-
planations for a rejection of the REH. One set of reasons relates to measurement error in
the individual forecast. Researchers have long recognized that forecasts of economic vari-
ables collected from public opinion surveys should be less informed than those sampled from
industry participants. However, industry participants, while relatively knowledgeable, may
not be properly motivated to devote the time and resources necessary to elicit their best
responses. The opposite is also possible.7 Having devoted substantial resources to produce
a forecast of the price of a widely traded asset, such as foreign exchange, forecasters may be
reluctant to reveal their true forecast before they have had a chance to trade for their own
account.8,9
Second, some forecasters may not have the symmetric quadratic loss function embodied
in typical measures of forecast accuracy, e.g., minimum mean squared error. (See Zellner
1986; Stockman 1987; Batchelor and Peel 1998.) In this case, the optimal forecast may
6The extent to which private information inﬂuences forecasts is more controversial in the foreign exchange
market than in the equity or bond markets. While Chionis and MacDonald (1997) maintain that there is
little or no private information in the foreign exchange market, Lyons (2002) argues that order ﬂow explains
much of the variation in prices. To the extent that one agrees with the market microstructure emphasis
on the importance of the private information embodied in dealer order ﬂow, the Figlewski-Wachtel critique
remains valid in the returns regression.
7Elliott and Ito (1999) show that, although a random walk forecast frequently outperforms the JCIF
survey forecasts using an MSE criterion, survey forecasts generally outperform the random walk, based on
an excess proﬁts criterion. This supports the contention that JCIF forecasters are properly motivated to
produce their best forecasts.
8To mitigate the conﬁdentiality problem in this case, the survey typically withholds individual forecasts
until the realization is known, or (as with the JCIF) masks the individual forecast by only reporting some
aggregate forecast (at the industry and total level) to the public.
9Furthermore, reported individual forecasts may not represent the mean of the forecaster’s subjective
probability distribution if that distribution is skewed and the forecaster reports another measure of central
tendency, e.g., the median.
7not be the MSE. In one scenario, related to the incentive aspect of the measurement error
problem, forecasters may have strategic incentives involving product diﬀerentiation.10
In addition to strategic behavior, another scenario in which forecasters may deviate from
the symmetric quadratic loss function is simply to maximize trading proﬁts. This requires
predicting the direction of change, regardless of MSE.11
Third, despite their best eﬀorts, forecasters may ﬁnd it diﬃcult to distinguish between a
temporary and permanent shift in the DGP. This diﬃculty underlies at least three theories of
rational forecast errors: the peso problem, learning about past regime changes, and bubbles.
Below we conduct tests for structural change in estimated unbiasedness coeﬃcients.
When unbiasedness cannot be rejected, the structural change test may show certain sub-
periods in which unbiasedness did not hold. In the obverse case, when unbiasedness can
be rejected, the structural change test may show certain subperiods in which unbiasedness
cannot be rejected. Either situation would lend some support to the theories attributing
bias to the diﬃculty of distinguishing temporary from permanent shifts.
3 Description of data
Every two weeks, the JCIF in Tokyo conducts telephone surveys of yen/dollar exchange
rate expectations from 44 ﬁrms. The forecasts are for the future spot rate at horizons
of one month, three months, and six months. Our data cover the period May 1985 to
March 1996. This data set has very few missing observations, making it close to a true
panel. For reporting purposes, the JCIF currently groups individual ﬁrms into four industry
categories: 1) banks and brokers, 2) insurance and trading companies, 3) exporters, and 4)
life insurance companies and importers. On the day after the survey, the JCIF announces
10Laster et al. (1999) called this practice “rational bias.” Prominent references in this growing literature
include Lamont (2002), Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996), and Batchelor and Dua (1990a,b, 1992). Because we
have access only to forecasts at the industry average level, we cannot test the strategic incentive hypotheses.
11See Elliott and Ito (1999), Boothe and Glassman (1987), LeBaron (2000), Leitch and Tanner (1991), Lai
(1990), Goldberg and Frydman (1996), and Pilbeam (1995). This type of loss function may appear to be
relevant only for relatively liquid assets such as foreign exchange, but not for macroeconomic ﬂows. However,
the directional goal is also used in models to predict business cycle turning points. Also, trends in ﬁnancial
engineering may lead to the creation of derivative contracts in macroeconomic variables, eg., CPI futures.
8overall and industry average forecasts. (For further details concerning the JCIF database,
see the descriptions in Ito (1990, 1994), Bryant (1995), and Elliott and Ito (1999).)
Figure 1 shows that, over the sample period (one of ﬂexible exchange rates and no
capital controls), the yen appreciated dramatically relative to the dollar, from a spot rate of
approximately 270 yen/dollar in May 1985 to approximately 90 yen/dollar in March 1996.
The path of appreciation was not steady, however. In the ﬁrst two years of the survey
alone, the yen appreciated to about 140 per dollar. The initial rapid appreciation of the
yen is generally attributed to the Plaza meeting in September 1985, in which the Group of
Five countries decided to let the dollar depreciate, relative to the other currencies. At the
Louvre meeting in February 1987, the Group of Seven agreed to stabilize exchange rates
by establishing soft target zones. These meetings may well be interpreted as unanticipated
regime changes, since, as we will see below, forecasters generally underestimated the rapid
appreciation following the Plaza meeting, then overestimated the value of the yen following
the Louvre meeting. Thus, forecasts during these periods may have been subject to peso and
learning problems. The period of stabilization lasted until about 1990, when yen appreciation
resumed and continued through the end of the sample period.
4 Empirical tests of rationality
Early studies of the unbiasedness aspect of rationality regressed the level of the realization
on the level of the forecast, testing the joint hypothesis that the intercept equalled zero and
the slope equalled one.12 However, since many macroeconomic variables have unit roots,
realization and forecast typically share a common stochastic trend a rational forecast will
be integrated and cointegrated with the target series. (See Granger, 1991, pp. 69-70.)
. According to the modern theory of regressions with integrated processes (see, inter alia
Banerjee et al., 1993), conventional OLS estimation and inference produce a slope coeﬃcient
12The eﬃciency aspect of rationality is sometimes tested by including additional variables in the fore-
caster’s information set, with corresponding hypotheses of zero coeﬃcients on these variables. See, e.g.,
Keane and Runkle (1990) for a more recent study using the level speciﬁcation and Bonham and Cohen
(1995) for a critique of Keane and Runkle’s integration accounting.
9that is biased toward one and, therefore, a test statistic that is biased toward accepting
the null of unbiasedness. The second generation studies of unbiasedness addressed this
inference problem by subtracting the current realization from the forecast as well as the future
realization, transforming the levels regression into a “returns” regression. In this speciﬁcation
of stationary variables, unbiasedness was still tested using the same (0,1) joint hypothesis
as in the levels regression. However, an implication of Engle and Granger (1987) is that the
levels regression is now interpreted as a cointegrating regression, with conventional t-statistics
following nonstandard distributions which depend on nuisance parameters. After establishing
that the realization and forecast are integrated and cointegrated, we perform two types of
rationality tests. The ﬁrst is a “restricted cointegration” test due to Liu and Maddala (1992).
This is a cointegration test imposing the (0,1) restriction on the levels regression.
It is signiﬁcant that, if realization and forecast are cointegrated, Liu and Maddala’s
(1992) technique is equivalent to regressing a stationary forecast error on a constant and
then testing whether the coeﬃcient equals zero (to test unbiasedness) and/or whether the
residuals are white noise (to test a type of weak eﬃciency). Pretests for unit roots in the
realization, forecast and forecast error are required for at least three reasons. First, univari-
ate tests of unbiasedness are invalid if the forecast error is not stationary. Second, following
Holden and Peel (1990), we show below (in section 4.1.1) that nonrejection of the joint test
in the bivariate regression is suﬃcient but not necessary for unbiasedness, since the joint
test is also an implicit test of weak eﬃciency with respect to the lagged forecast error. A
zero intercept in the (correctly speciﬁed) univariate test is a necessary as well as suﬃcient
condition for unbiasedness. Third, the Engel-Granger (1987) representation theorem proves
that a cointegrating regression such as the levels joint regression ((2) below) has an error
correction form that includes both diﬀerenced variables and an error correction term in lev-
els. Under the joint null, the error correction term is the forecast error. While the returns
form of the bivariate regression, is not, strictly speaking, misspeciﬁed (since the regressor
subtracts st, not se
t−1, from se
t), the ECM speciﬁcation may produce a better ﬁt to the data
10and, therefore, a more powerful test of the unbiasedness restrictions. We conduct such tests
using a form of the ECM due to Hakkio and Rush (1989).
4.1 Joint tests of unbiasedness and weak eﬃciency
4.1.1 The lack of necessity critique
Many, perhaps most, empirical tests of the “unbiasedness” of survey forecasts are con-
ducted using the bivariate regression equation
st+h − st = αi,h + βi,h(se
i,t,h − st) + εi,t,h. (2)
It is typical for researchers to interpret their non-rejection of the joint null (αi,h,βi,h) = (0,1)
as a necessary condition for unbiasedness. However, Holden and Peel (1990) show that this
result is a suﬃcient, though not a necessary, condition for unbiasedness. The intuition for the
lack of necessity comes from interpreting the right-hand-side of the bivariate unbiasedness
regression as a linear combination of two potentially unbiased forecasts: a constant equal
to the unconditional mean forecast plus a variable forecast, i.e., st+h − st = (1 − βi,h) ×
E(se
i,t,h − st) + βi,h(se
i,t,h − st) + εi,t,h. Then the intercept is αi,h = (1 − βi,h) × E(se
i,t,h − st).
The necessary and suﬃcient condition for unbiasedness is that the unconditional mean of the
subjective expectation E[se
i,t,h−st] equal the unconditional mean for the objective expectation
E[st+h − st]. However, this equality can be satisﬁed without αi,h being equal to zero, i.e.,
βi,h = 1.
Figure 2 shows that an inﬁnite number of αi,h,βi,h estimates are consistent with unbi-
asedness. The only constraint is that the regression line intersect the 45 degree ray from the
origin where the sample mean of the forecast and target are equal. Note that, in the case of
diﬀerenced variables, this can occur at the origin, so that αi,h = 0, but βi,h is unrestricted
(see Figure 3). It is easy to see why unbiasedness holds: in Figures 2 and 3 the sum of all
horizontal deviations from the 45 degree line to the regression line, i.e., forecast errors, equal
zero. However, when αi,h  = 0, and αi,h  = (1 − βi,h) × E(se
i,t,h − st), there is bias regard-
11less of the value of βi,h. See Figure 4, where the bias, E(st+h − se
i,t,h), implies systematic
underforecasts.
To investigate the rationality implications of diﬀerent values for αi,h and βi,h, we fol-
low Clements and Hendry (1998) and rewrite the forecast error in the bivariate regression
framework of (2) as
ηi,t,h = st+h − se
i,t,h = αi,h + (βi,h − 1)(se
i,t,h − st) + εi,t,h (3)
A special case of weak eﬃciency occurs when the forecast and forecast error are uncor-
related, i.e.,
E[ηi,t,h(se
i,t,h − st)] = 0 (4)
= αi,hE(se




Thus, satisfaction of the joint hypothesis (αi,h, βi,h) = (0,1) is also suﬃcient for weak ef-
ﬁciency with respect to the current forecast. However, it should be noted that (4) may
still hold even if the joint hypothesis is rejected. Thus, satisfaction of the joint hypothesis
represents suﬃcient conditions for both unbiasedness and this type of weak eﬃciency, but
necessary conditions for neither.
If βi,h= 1, then, whether or not αi,h= 0, the variance of the forecast error equals the
variance of the bivariate regression residual, since then var(ηi,t,h) = (βi,h − 1)2var(se
i,t,h −
st) + var(εi,t,h) + 2(βi,h − 1)cov[(se
i,t,h − st),εi,t,h] = var(εi,t,h). Figure 4 illustrates this
point. Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969) required only that βi,h= 1 in their deﬁnition of forecast
eﬃciency. If in addition to βi,h= 1, αi,h= 0, then the mean square forecast error also equals
the variance of the forecast. Mincer and Zarnowitz emphasized that, as long as the loss
function is symmetric, as is the case with a minimum mean square error criterion, satisfaction
of the joint hypothesis implies optimality of forecasts.
124.1.2 Empirical results of joint tests
Since Hansen and Hodrick (1980), researchers have recognized that, when data are sam-
pled more frequently than the forecast horizon (h), forecast errors may follow an h-1 pe-
riod moving average process. The typical procedure has been to use a variance-covariance
matrix which allows for generalized serial correlation. Throughout this paper, we use the
Newey and West (1987) procedure, with the number of lagged residuals set to h-1. To en-
sure a positive semi-deﬁnite VCV matrix, we use a Bartlett window (see Hamilton, 1994,
pp. 281-84.)
In Tables 1.1 we report results for the joint unbiasedness tests. We reject the joint
hypothesis (αi,h,βi,h) = (0,1) at the 5% signiﬁcance level for all groups at the one-month
horizon (indicating the possible role of ineﬃciency with respect to the current forecast), but
only for the exporters at the three- and six- month horizons.
Now consider the results of the separate tests of the joint hypothesis. The signiﬁcance
of the αi,h’s in the joint regressions (2) generally deteriorates with horizon. There is only
one rejection at the 5% level for each of the two shorter horizons. However, the αi,h’s are
all rejected at this signiﬁcance level for the six-month horizon. The test results for the
βi,h’s follow the opposite pattern with respect to horizon. The null that βi,h= 1 is rejected
for all groups at the one-month horizon, but only for the exporters at the three- and six-
month horizons. This implies that weak eﬃciency with respect to the current forecast fails
at the one-month horizon, but not at the longer horizons, with only two exceptions. Thus,
it appears that the pattern of rejection of the joint hypothesis is predominantly inﬂuenced
by tests of whether the slope coeﬃcient equals one. That is, tests of the joint hypothesis at
the one-month horizon are rejected due to failure of this type of weak eﬃciency, not simple
unbiasedness.
For this reason, Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969) and Holden and Peel (1990) suggest that, if
one begins by testing the joint hypothesis, rejections in this ﬁrst stage should be followed by
tests of the simple unbiasedness hypothesis in a second stage. Only if unbiasedness is rejected
13in this second stage should one conclude that forecasts are biased. For reasons described
below (in section 4.2), our treatment eliminates the ﬁrst stage, so that unbiasedness and
weak eﬃciency are separately assessed using the forecast error as the dependent variable.
Finding greater eﬃciency at the longer-horizon is unusual, because forecasting diﬃculty
is usually thought to increase with horizon. However, the longer-horizon result may not be
as conclusive as the βi,h statistics suggest. For all tests at all horizons, the null hypothe-
sis that βi,h equals zero also cannot be rejected. Thus, for the longer two horizons (with
just the one exception for exporters at the three-month horizon), hypothesis testing cannot
distinguish between the null hypotheses that βi,h equals one or zero. Therefore, we cannot
conclude that weak eﬃciency with respect to the current forecast holds while unbiasedness
does not. The failure to precisely estimate the slope coeﬃcient also produces R2s that are
below 0.05 in all regressions.13 The conclusion is that testing only the joint hypothesis has
the potential to obscure the diﬀerence in performance between the unbiasedness and weak
eﬃciency tests. This conclusion is reinforced by an examination of ﬁgures 5 - 7, the scatter
plots and regression lines for the bivariate regressions.14 All three scatter plots have a strong
vertical orientation. With this type of data, it is easy to ﬁnd the vertical midpoint and test
whether it is diﬀerent from zero. Thus, (one-parameter) tests of simple unbiasedness are
feasible. However, it is diﬃcult to ﬁt a precisely estimated regression line to this scatter,
because the small variation in the forecast variable inﬂates the standard error of the slope
coeﬃcient. This explains why the βi,h’s are so imprecisely estimated that the null hypothe-
ses that βi,h = 1 and 0 are simultaneously not rejected. This also explains why the R2s
are so low. Thus, examination of the scatter plots also reveal why bivariate regressions are
potentially misleading about weak eﬃciency as well as simple unbiasedness. Therefore, in
13As we report in section 5, this lack of power is at least consistent with the failure to reject microhomo-
geneity at all three horizons.
14Note that, for illustrative purposes only, we compute the expectational variable as the four-group average
percentage change in the forecast. However, recall that, despite the failure to reject micro-homogeneity at
any horizon, the Figlewski-Wachtel critique implies that these parameter estimates are inconsistent in the
presence of private information. (See the last paragraph in this subsection.)
14contrast to both Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969) and Holden and Peel (1990), we prefer to sep-
arate tests for unbiasedness from tests for (all types of) weak eﬃciency at the initial stage.
This obviates the need for a joint test. In the next section, we conduct such tests, making
use of cointegration between forecast and realization where it exists.15
More fundamentally, the relatively vertical scatter of the regression observations around
the origin is consistent with an approximately unbiased forecast of a random walk in ex-
change rate levels.16 In ﬁgures 11, 12, and 13, we observe a corresponding time series pat-
tern of variation between the forecasts and realizations in return form. As Bryant lamented
in reporting corresponding regressions using a shorter sample from the JCIF, “the regres-
sion...is...not one to send home proudly to grandmother” (Bryant, 1995, p. 51). He drew
the conclusion that “analysts should have little conﬁdence in a model speciﬁcation [e.g., un-
covered interest parity] setting [the average forecast] exactly equal to the next-period value
of the model...[M]odel-consistent expectations...presume a type of forward-looking behavior
[e.g., weak eﬃciency] that is not consistent with survey data on expectations” (Bryant, 1995,
p. 40).
4.2 Pretests for rationality: the stationarity of the forecast error
To test the null hypothesis of a unit root, we estimate the augmented Dickey-Fuller(1979)
(ADF) regression
∆yt+1 = α + βyt + γt +
p  
k=1
θk∆yt+1−k + ǫt+1 (5)
where y is the level and ﬁrst diﬀerence of the spot exchange rate, the level and ﬁrst diﬀerence
of each group forecast, the residual from the (unrestricted) cointegrating regression and the
forecast error (i.e., the residual from the “restricted” cointegrating equation). The number
15However, in the general case of biased and/or ineﬃcient forecasts, Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969, p. 11)
also viewed the bivariate regression “as a method of correcting the forecasts ...to improve [their] accuracy
...Theil (1966, p.33) called it the ‘optimal linear correction.”’ That is, the correction would involve 1)
subtracting αi,h, then 2) multiplying by 1/βi,h. Graphically, this is a translation of the regression line
followed by a rotation, until the regression line coincides with the 45 degree line.
16Other researchers (e.g., Bryant (1995)) have found similar vertical scatters for regressions where the
independent variable, e.g., the forward premium/discount ft,h−st, the “exchange risk premium” ft,h−st+h,
or the diﬀerence between domestic and foreign interest rates (i − i∗), exhibits little variation.
15of lagged diﬀerences to include in (5) is chosen by adding lags until a Lagrange Multiplier
test fails to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation (up to lag 12). We test the null
hypothesis of a unit root (i.e., β = 0) with the ADF t and z tests. We also test the joint
null hypothesis of a unit root and no linear trend (i.e., β = 0 and γ = 0).
As can be seen in Tables 2.1 - 2.3, we fail to reject the null of a unit root in the log of the
spot rate in two of the three unit root tests, but we reject the unit root in the hth diﬀerence
for all three horizons. We conclude that the log of the spot rate is integrated of order one.
Similarly, we conclude that the log of the forecast of each spot rate is integrated of order one.
Thus, we can conduct cointegration tests on the spot rate and each corresponding forecast.
The null of a unit root in the (unrestricted) residual in the “cointegrating regression” equation
6 is rejected at the 10% level or less for all groups and horizons except group three (exporters)
at the six-month horizon. Thus, we can immediately reject unbiasedness for the latter group
and horizon. Next, since a stationary forecast error is a necessary condition for unbiasedness,
we test for unbiasedness (as well as) and weak eﬃciency in levels using Liu and Maddala’s
(1992) method of “restricted cointegration.” This speciﬁcation imposes the joint restriction
αi,h = 0, βi,h = 1 on the bivariate regression
st+h = αi,h + βi,hse
i,t,h + εi,t,h (6)
and tests whether the residual (the forecast error) is non-stationary. In a bivariate regres-
sion, any cointegrating vector is unique. Therefore, if we ﬁnd that the forecast errors are
stationary, then the joint restriction is not rejected, and (0,1) must be the unique cointe-
grating vector.17 The advantage of the one-step restricted cointegration is that, if the joint
hypothesis is true, then tests which impose this cointegrating vector have greater power than
those which estimate a cointegrating vector. See, e.g., Maynard and Phillips (2001).
Note that the Holden and Peel (1990) critique does not apply in the I(1) case, because the
intercept cannot be an unbiased forecast of a nonstationary variable. Thus, the cointegrating
17It is also possible to estimate the cointegrating parameters and jointly test whether they are zero and
one. A variety of methods, such as those due to Saikkonen (1991) or Phillips and Hansen (1990), exist that
allow for inference in cointegrated bivariate regressions.
16regression line of the level realization on the level forecast must have both α = 0 and β = 1
for unbiasedness to hold. This diﬀers from Figure 3, the scatterplot in diﬀerences, where
αi,h = 0 but βi,h  = 1. Intuitively, the reason for the diﬀerence in results is that the scatterplot
in levels must lie in the ﬁrst quadrant, i.e., no negative values of the forecast or realization.
At the one-month horizon, the null of a unit root in the residual of the restricted cointe-
grating regression (i.e., the forecast error) is rejected at the 1% level for all groups. We ﬁnd
nearly identical results at the three-month horizon; the null of a unit root in the forecast
error is rejected at the 5% level for all groups. Thus, for these regressions we can conduct
rationality tests by regressing the forecast error on a constant (hypothesized equal to zero
for unbiasedness) and other information set variables (whose coeﬃcients are hypothesized
equal to zero for eﬃciency). (Recall just above that we failed to reject the null of a unit
root in the unrestricted residual for the six-month forecasts of exporters.) Now, in the case
of the restricted residual, the other three groups failed to reject a unit root at the 10% level
in two out of three of the unit root tests.18 (See ﬁgures 8, 9, and 10.) Thus, in contrast to
the results for the two shorter horizons, at the six-month horizon, the evidence is clearly in
favor of a unit root in the forecast error for all four groups. Therefore, we reject the null of
simple unbiasedness because a forecast error with a unit root cannot be mean zero. In fact,
given our ﬁnding of a unit root in the forecast errors, rationality tests regressing the forecast
error on a constant and/or other information set variables would be invalid.
4.3 Univariate tests for unbiasedness
The unbiasedness equation is speciﬁed as
ηi,t,h = st+h − se
i,t,h = αi,h + ǫi,t,h, (7)
where ηi,t,h is the forecast error of individual i, for an h-period-ahead forecast made at time
t. The results are reported in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. For the one-month horizon, unbiasedness
cannot be rejected at conventional signiﬁcance levels for any group. For the three-month
18As expected, exporters failed to reject at the 10% level in all three tests.
17horizon, unbiasedness is rejected only for exporters (at a p-value of 0.03). As we saw in the
previous subsection, rationality is rejected for all groups at the six-month horizon, due to
nonstationary forecast errors.19
In these unbiasedness tests, as well as all others, it is possible that coeﬃcient estimates
for the entire sample are not stable over subsamples. The lower panels of 3.1 and 3.2 contain
results of the test for equality of intercepts in four equal subperiods, each consisting of
approximately 75 biweekly forecasts:
ηi,t,h = st+h − se
i,t,h = αi,h,1 + αi,h,2 + αi,h,3 + αi,h,4 + ǫi,t,h. (8)
For both one- and three-month horizons, all four forecaster groups undervalued the yen
in the ﬁrst and third subperiods. This is understandable, as both these subperiods were
characterized by overall yen appreciation. (See Fig. 1.) Evidently, forecasters underesti-
mated the degree of appreciation. Exporters were the only group to undervalue the yen in
the last subperiod as well, although that was not one of overall yen appreciation. This is
another perspective on the ”wishful thinking” of exporters.20
The main diﬀerence between the two horizons is in the signiﬁcance of the test for struc-
tural breaks. For the one-month horizon, the estimates of the individual break dummies
generally do not reach statistical signiﬁcance, and the test for their equality rejects only
for the exporters. Thus, the exporters’ bias was not constant throughout the sample. In
contrast, for the three-month horizon, the test for no structural breaks is rejected at the 5%
level for all groups, even though unbiasedness itself is rejected for the full sample only for
exporters. Even setting aside the bias and variability of exporters’ forecasts, our structural
break tests allow us to conclude that there is considerably more variation around roughly zero
19The direction of the bias for exporters is negative; that is, they systematically underestimate the value
of the yen, relative to the dollar. Ito (1990) found the same tendency using only the ﬁrst two years of survey
data (1985-1987). He characterized this depreciation bias as a type of “wishful thinking” on the part of
exporters.
20Ito (1994) conducted a similar analysis for the aggregate of all forecasters, but without an explicit test
for structural breaks.
18mean forecast errors at the longer horizon. This probably reﬂects the additional uncertainty
inherent in longer-term forecasts.21
4.4 Unbiasedness tests using Error Correction Models
As mentioned at the beginning of the previous subsection, the Error Correction Model
provides an alternate speciﬁcation for representing the relationship between cointegrated
variables.










The regressors include the smallest number of lagged dependent variables required such that
we do not reject the hypothesis that the residuals are white noise. We impose γi,h = 1 when
“restricted” cointegration of st+h and se
i,t,h is not rejected. Recall that one- and three-month
forecast errors were found to be stationary, so it was for these two horizons that estimation
of the simple unbiasedness equation was possible. Although it would be valid to estimate
the ECM at the six-month horizon using the (unrestricted) stationary cointegrating residual
(i.e., for all groups but exporters), we elect not to, because the nonstationarity of the forecast
error itself implies a failure of the unbiasedness restrictions.22
According to this speciﬁcation of the ECM, the change in the spot rate is a function of
the change in the forecast, interpreted as a short-run eﬀect, and the current forecast error,
interpreted as a long-run adjustment to past disequilibria. αi,h, the coeﬃcient of the error
correction term, represents the fraction of the forecast error observed at t-h that is corrected
by time t. A negative coeﬃcient indicates a stabilizing adjustment of expectations. This
formulation of the ECM has the advantage that the misspeciﬁcation (due to omitted variable
21This is consistent with the ﬁnding of nonstationary forecast errors for all groups at the six-month horizon.
22Our empirical speciﬁcation of the ECM also includes an intercept. This will help us to determine whether
there are structural breaks in the ECM.
19bias) of the regression of the diﬀerenced future spot rate on the diﬀerenced current forecast
can be gauged by the statistical signiﬁcance of the error correction term.23
Then, as ﬁrst asserted by Hakkio and Rush (1989), the unbiasedness restriction is rep-
resented by the joint hypothesis that −αi,h = βi,h = 1 and all δ and η coeﬃcients equal
zero.24 (The hypothesized coeﬃcient on the error correction term of -1 reﬂects the unbiased-
ness requirement that the entire forecast error is corrected within the forecast horizon h.)
We also test unbiasedness without including lagged dependent variables but incorporating
robust standard errors which allow for generalized serial correlation and heteroscedasticity.
This allows comparison with the univariate and bivariate unbiasedness equations.
First, we compare the ECM results to the joint unbiasedness restrictions in the returns
regressions, using robust standard errors in both cases. Although the estimated coeﬃcient
of the error correction term is generally negative, indicating a stable error correction mecha-
nism,25 the coeﬃcient does not reach a 5% signiﬁcance level in any of the regressions. Thus,
there is little evidence that the error correction term plays a signiﬁcant role in the long-run
dynamics of exchange rate changes. The R2s in the ECM, while never more than 0.044, still
are greater than in the joint unbiasedness speciﬁcation, typically by factors of three to ﬁve.
Second, we compare the ECM results to the univariate simple unbiasedness regressions,
again using robust standard errors in both cases. The ECM unbiasedness restrictions are
rejected at a 5% level more often than in the simple unbiasedness tests. Whereas the only
rejection of simple unbiasedness at the shorter two horizons is for exporters at the three-
23Zacharatos and Sutcliﬀe (2002) note that the inclusion of the contemporaneous spot forecast (in their
paper, the forward rate) as a regressor assumes that the latter is weakly exogenous; that is, deviations from
unbiasedness are corrected only by movements in the realized spot rate. These authors prefer a bivariate
ECM speciﬁcation, in which the change in the future spot rate and the change in the contemporaneous
forecast are functions of an error correction term and lags of the dependent variables. However, Zivot (1998)
points out that, if the spot rate and forecast are contemporaneously correlated, then our single equation
speciﬁcation does not make any assumptions about the weak exogeneity of the forecast.
24Since we include an intercept, we also test the restriction that the intercept equals zero–both individually
and as part of the joint unbiasedness hypothesis.
25The only exception is for exporters at the one-month horizon.
20month horizon, the ECM restrictions are rejected for three out of four groups at the one-
month horizon as well as for exporters at the three-month horizon.
While it is uncontroversial that, for testing unbiasedness, the ECM is preferred to the
conventional bivariate speciﬁcation in returns, it is not at all clear that the ECM is pre-
ferred to the simple univariate test of unbiasedness. Can the more decisive rejections of
unbiasedness using the ECM versus the simple univariate speciﬁcation be reconciled?26
One way to proceed is to determine whether the unbiasedness restrictions imposed on
the ECM are necessary as well as suﬃcient, as is the case for the simple unbiasedness test,
or just suﬃcient, as is the case for the bivariate unbiasedness test. Thus, it is possible that
the stronger rejections of unbiasedness in the ECM speciﬁcation are due to the implicit test
of weak eﬃciency with respect to the current forecast. That is, the Holden and Peel (1990)
critique applies to the Hakkio and Rush (1989) test in (9), as well as the joint unbiasedness
test in the returns regression. Setting βi,h, the coeﬃcient of the contemporaneous diﬀerenced
forecast, equal to one produces an ECM in which the dependent variable is the forecast error:
st − s
e
i,t,h = (1 + αi,h)(st − s
e
i,t−h,h) (10)
Thus, in the ECM the necessary and suﬃcient condition for unbiasedness is that αi,hequals
-1.27 Table 4.1 contains tests of this conjecture. Here the joint hypothesis that the intercept
equals zero and αi,h equals minus one produces exactly the same results as in the simple
unbiasedness tests.28 It is interesting that, even when we can decouple the test for weak
eﬃciency with respect to the current forecast from the unbiasedness test, the test of un-
biasedness using this ECM speciﬁcation still requires weak eﬃciency with respect to the
current forecast error.29
26The standard errors in the univariate regression are about the same as those for the ECM. (By deﬁnition,
of course, the R2s for the univariate regression equal zero.)
27Since we estimate the restricted ECM with an intercept, unbiasedness also requires the intercept to be
equal to zero.
28Since the intercept in equation 10 is not signiﬁcant in any regression, the simple hypothesis that αi,h
equals one also fares the same as the simple unbiasedness tests.
29For purposes of comparison with both the bivariate joint and simple unbiasedness restrictions, we have
used the ECM results using the robust standard errors. In all cases testing the ECM restrictions using
214.5 Explicit tests of weak eﬃciency
The literature on rational expectations exhibits even less consensus as to the deﬁnition
of eﬃciency than it does for unbiasedness. In general, an eﬃcient forecast incorporates
all available information—private as well as public. It follows that there should be no
relationship between forecast error and any information variables known to the forecaster
at the time of the forecast. Weak eﬃciency commonly denotes the orthogonality of the
forecast error with respect to functions of the target and prediction. For example, there is no
contemporaneous relationship between forecast and forecast error which could be exploited
to reduce the error. Strong eﬃciency denotes orthogonality with respect to the remaining
variables in the information set. Below we perform two types of weak eﬃciency tests. In the
ﬁrst type, we regress each group’s forecast error on three sets of weak eﬃciency variables.30
1. Single and cumulative lags of the mean forecast error (lagged one period):
st+h − s
e





m,t+h−k,h) + ǫi,t,h (11)
2. Single and cumulative lags of mean expected depreciation (lagged one period):
st+h − s
e





m,t+h−k,h − st−k) + ǫi,t,h (12)
3. Single and cumulative lags of actual depreciation:
st+h − s
e
i,t,h = αi,h +
h+6  
k=h
βi,t+h−k(st+h−k − st−k) + ǫi,t,h (13)
For each group and forecast horizon, we regress the forecast error on the most recent seven
lags of the information set variable, both singly and cumulatively. We use a Wald test of
F-statistics based on whitened residuals produces rejections of all restrictions, simple and joint, except a
zero intercept. Hakkio and Rush (1989) found similarly strong rejections of (9), where the forecast was the
forward rate.
30Notice that the ﬁrst two sets of weak eﬃciency variables include the mean forecast, rather than the
individual group forecast. Our intention is to allow a given group to incorporate information from other
groups’ forecasts via the prior mean forecast. This requires an extra lag in the information set variables,
relative to a contemporaneously available variable such as the realized exchange rate depreciation.
22the null hypothesis αi,h = βi,t+h−k = 0 and report chi-square test statistics, with degrees of
freedom equal to the number of regressors excluding the intercept. If we were to perform
only simple regressions (i.e., on each lag individually), estimates of coeﬃcients and tests of
signiﬁcance could be biased toward rejection due to the omission of relevant variables. If
we were to perform only multivariate regressions, tests for joint signiﬁcance could be biased
toward nonrejection due to the inclusion of irrelevant variables. It is also possible that
joint tests are signiﬁcant but individual tests are not. This will be the case when the linear
combination of (relatively uncorrelated) regressors spans the space of the dependent variable,
but individual regressors do not.
In the only reported eﬃciency tests on JCIF data, Ito (1990) separately regressed the
forecast error (average, group, and individual ﬁrm) on a single lagged forecast error, lagged
forward premium, and lagged actual change. He found that, for the 51 biweekly forecasts
between May 1985 and June 1987, rejections increased from a relative few at the one- or three-
month horizons to virtual unanimity at the six-month horizon. When he added a second
lagged term for actual depreciation, rejections increased “dramatically” for all horizons.
The second type of weak eﬃciency tests uses the Breusch-Godfrey(1978) LM test for the
null of no serial correlation of order k=h or greater, up to order k=h+6, in the residuals of
the forecast error regression, equation (11).31,32 Results for all eﬃciency tests for the one-
and three-month horizons are presented in Tables 5.1 - 5.8. (Recall that the nonstationarity
of the forecast errors at the six-month horizon is an implicit rejection of weak eﬃciency.)
For each group, horizon, and variable, there are seven individual tests, i.e., on a single lag,
and six joint tests, i.e., on multiple lags. These 13 tests are multiplied by four groups times
two horizons times three weak eﬃciency variables for a total of 312 eﬃciency tests.
31This is a general test, not only because it allows for an alternative hypothesis of higher-order serial
correlation of speciﬁed order, but also because it allows for serial correlation to be generated by AR, MA or
ARMA processes.
32We use the F-statistic because the χ2 test statistics tend to over-reject, while the F-tests have more
appropriate signiﬁcance levels (see Kiviet (1987)).
23Using approximately nine more years of data than Ito (1990), we ﬁnd many rejections.
In some cases, nearly all single lag tests are rejected, yet few if any joint tests are rejected.
(See, e.g., expected depreciation at the three-month horizon.) In other cases, nearly all joint
tests are rejected, but few individual tests. (See, e..g, actual depreciation at the three-month
horizon.) Remarkably, all but one LM test for serial correlation at a speciﬁed lag produces
a rejection at less than a 10% level, with most at less than a 5% level. Thus, it appears that
the generality of the alternative hypothesis in the LM test permits it to reject at a much
greater rate than the conventional weak eﬃciency tests, in which the variance-covariance
matrix incorporates the Newey-West-Bartlett correction for heteroscedasticity and serial
correlation. Finally, unlike Ito (1990), we ﬁnd no strong pattern between horizon length and
number of rejections.
5 Microhomogeneity tests
In addition to testing the rationality hypotheses at the individual level, we are interested
in the degree of heterogeneity of coeﬃcients across forecasters. Demonstrating that individ-
ual forecasters diﬀer systematically in their forecasts (and forecast generating processes) has
implications for the market microstructure research program. As Frankel and Froot (1990,
p. 182) noted, “the tremendous volume of foreign exchange trading is another piece of evi-
dence that reinforces the idea of heterogeneous expectations, since it takes diﬀerences among
market participants to explain why they trade.”
Micro-homogeneity should have implications for rationality, as well. Intuitively, if all
forecasters pass rationality tests, then their corresponding regression coeﬃcients should be
equal. However, the converse is not necessarily true: if all forecasters have equal regression
coeﬃcients, they will not satisfy rationality conditions if they are all biased or ineﬃcient
to the same degree with respect to the same variables. For the univariate unbiasedness
regressions, the null of micro-homogeneity is given by H0 : αih = αjh, for all i,j  = i.
Before testing for homogeneous intercepts in equation (7) we must specify the form for
our GMM system variance-covariance matrix. Keane and Runkle (1990) ﬁrst accounted for
24cross-sectional correlation (in price level forecasts) using a GMM estimator on pooled data.
Bonham and Cohen (2001) tested the pooling speciﬁcation by replacing Zellner’s (1962)
SUR variance-covariance matrix with a GMM counterpart that incorporates the Newey-
West single equation corrections (used in our individual equation tests above) plus allowances
for corresponding cross-covariances, both contemporaneous and lagged. Bonham and Cohen
(2001) constructed a Wald statistic for testing the micro-homogeneity of individual forecaster
regression coeﬃcients in a system.33
Keane and Runkle (1990) provided some empirical support for their modeling of cross-
sectional correlations, noting that the average covariance between a pair of forecasters is 58%
of the average forecast variance. In contrast, we use Pesaran’s (2004) CD (cross-sectional
dependence) test to check for lagged as well as contemporaneous correlations of forecast










where T is the number of time periods, N = 4 is the number of individual forecasters, and
ˆ ρij is the sample correlation coeﬃcient between forecasters i and j, i  = j. Under the null
hypothesis of no cross-correlation, CD
a ∼ N(0,1).34 See Table 6.0 for CD test results. We
tested for cross-correlation in forecast errors from lag zero up to lags four and eight, for
the one-month and three month forecast horizons, respectively. (The nonstationarity of the
six-month forecast error precludes using the CD test at that horizon.) At the one-month
horizon, cross-correlations from lags zero through 4 are each signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Since
rational forecasts allow for (individual) serial correlation of forecast errors at lags of h-1 or
less, and h= 2 for the one-month horizon, the cross-correlations at lags two through four
indicate violations of weak eﬃciency. Similarly, at the three-month horizon, where h-1=5,
33Elliott and Ito (1999) used single equation estimation that incorporated a White correction for het-
eroscedasticity and a Newey-West correction for serial correlation. (See the discussion below of Ito’s tests of
forecaster heterogeneity.)
34Unlike Breusch and Pagan’s (1980) LM test for cross-sectional dependence, Pesaran’s (2004) CD test is
robust to multiple breaks in slope coeﬃcients and error variances, as long as the unconditional means of the
variables are stationary and the residuals are symmetrically distributed.
25there is signiﬁcant cross-correlation at lag six.35 However, it should be noted that, for many
lags shorter than h, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that there are no cross-correlated
forecast errors.
Nevertheless, in our micro-homogeneity tests, we follow Bonham and Cohen (2001), al-
lowing for an MA(h-1) residual process, both individually and among pairs of forecast errors.
(See the appendix for details.) By more accurately describing the panel’s residual variance-
covariance structure, we expect this systems approach to improve the consistency of our
estimates. Consider ﬁrst the four bivariate regressions. Recall that we rejected the joint
hypothesis (αi,h,βi,h) = (0,1) at the 5% signiﬁcance level for all groups at the one-month
horizon (indicating the possible role of ineﬃciency with respect to the current forecast), but
only for the exporters at the three- and six-month horizons. However, there are no rejections
of micro-homogeneity for any horizon.36
The micro-homogeneity test results are very diﬀerent for the one- and three-month sys-
tems of univariate unbiasedness regressions. (Recall that unbiasedness was rejected for all
groups at the six-month horizon due to the nonstationarity of the forecast error.) De-
spite having only one failure of unbiasedness at the 5% level for the two shorter horizons,
micro-homogeneity is rejected at a level of virtually zero for both horizons. The rejection
of micro-homogeneity at the one-month horizon occurs despite the failure to reject unbi-
asedness for any of the industry groups. We hypothesize that the consistent rejection of
micro-homogeneity regardless of the results of individual unbiasedness tests is the result of
suﬃcient variation in individual bias estimates as well as precision in these estimates. Ac-
35There are three instances of statistically signiﬁcant negative test statistics for lags greater than h-1,
none for lags less than or equal to h-1. Thus, some industries produce relatively high forecast errors several
periods after others produce relative low forecast errors, and this information is not fully incorporated in
some current forecasts.
36The nonrejection of micro-homogeneity in bivariate regressions does not, however, mean that one can
avoid aggregation bias by using the mean forecast. Even if the bivariate regressions were correctly interpreted
as joint tests of unbiasedness and weak eﬃciency with respect to the current forecast, and even if the
regressions had suﬃcient power to reject a false null, the micro-homogeneity tests would be subject to
additional econometric problems. According to the Figlewski-Wachtel (1983) critique, successfully passing a
pre-test for micro-homogeneity does not ensure that estimated coeﬃcients from such consensus regressions
will be consistent. See section 2.1.
26cording to these tests, aggregation of individual forecasts into a mean forecast is invalid at
all horizons.
In addition to testing the weak eﬃciency hypothesis at the individual level, we are in-
terested in the degree of heterogeneity of coeﬃcients across forecasters. Here the null of
micro-homogeneity is given by H0 : φil = φjl, for l = h,...h+6, for all i,j  = i. As explained
in the section on eﬃciency tests, there are 312 tests (not 468, due to a nonstationary forecast
error for all four groups at the six-month horizon) / 4 groups = 83 micro-homogeneity tests.
The null hypothesis of equal coeﬃcients is H0 : αi,h = αj,h,βi,t+h−k = βj,t+h−k for all i,j  = i.
As with the micro-homogeneity tests for unbiasedness, our GMM variance-covariance matrix
accounts for serial correlation of order h-1 or less, generalized heteroscedasticity, and cross-
sectional correlation or order h-1 or less. We report χ2(n) statistics, where n is the number
of coeﬃcient restrictions, with corresponding p-values. Rather than perform all 83 micro-
homogeneity tests, we choose a sample consisting of the shortest and longest lag for which
there are corresponding individual and joint tests (i.e., for the k=h+1st and k=h+6th lag).
Thus, there are 4 tests (two individual and two corresponding joint tests) times two horizons
times three variables for a total of 24 tests. Every one of the micro-homogeneity tests are
rejected at the 0% level. As pointed out by Bryant (1995), a ﬁnding of micro-heterogeneity
in unbiasedness and weak eﬃciency tests also casts doubt on the assumption of a rational
representative agent commonly used in macroeconomic and asset pricing models.
5.1 Ito’s heterogeneity tests
In Table 7.1, we replicate Ito’s (1990) and Elliott and Ito’s (1999) test for forecaster
“heterogeneity.” This speciﬁcation regresses the deviation of the individual forecast from
the cross-sectional average forecast on a constant. Algebraically, Ito’s regression can be
derived from the individual forecast error regression by subtracting the mean forecast error
regression. Thus, because it simply replaces the forecast error with the individual deviation
27from the mean forecast, it does not suﬀer from aggregation bias (c.f. Figlewski and Wachtel
(1983)) or pooling bias (c.f. Zarnowitz (1985)). 37,38
se
i,t,h − se
m,t,h = (αi,h − αm) + (εi,t,h − εm,t) (15)
As above, we use the Newey-West-Bartlett variance-covariance matrix.
One may view Ito’s “heterogeneity” tests as complementary to our micro-homogeneity
tests. On the one hand, one is not certain whether a single (or pair of?) individual rejec-
tion(s) of, say, the null hypothesis of a zero mean deviation in Ito’s test would result in a
rejection of micro-homogeneity overall. On the other hand, a rejection of micro-homogeneity
does not tell us which groups are the most signiﬁcant violators of the null hypothesis. It
turns out that Ito’s mean deviation test produces rejections at a level of 6% or less for all
groups at all horizons except for banks and brokers at the one-month horizon and life insur-
ance and import companies at the six-month horizon.39 Since Ito’s regressions have a similar
form (though not a similar economic interpretation) to the tests for univariate unbiasedness
in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, it is not surprising that micro-homogeneity tests on the four-equation
system of Ito equations produce rejections at a level of virtually zero for all three horizons.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we undertake a reexamination of the rationality and diversity of JCIF
forecasts of the yen-dollar exchange rate. In several ways we update and extend the seminal
paper by Ito (1990). In particular, we have attempted to explore the nature of rationality
tests on integrated variables. We show that tests based on the “conventional” bivariate
regression in returns, while correctly speciﬁed in terms of integration accounting, have two
37Recall that our group results are not entirely comparable to Ito’s (1990), since our dataset, unlike his,
combines insurance companies and trading companies into one group, and life insurance companies and
import-oriented companies into another group.
38Chionis and MacDonald (1997) performed an Ito-type test on individual expectations data from Con-
sensus Forecasts of London.
39Elliott and Ito (1999), who have access to forecasts for the 42 individual ﬁrms in the survey, ﬁnd that,
for virtually the same sample period as ours, the null hypothesis of a zero deviation from the mean forecast
is rejected at the 5% level by 17 ﬁrms at the one-month horizon, 13 ﬁrms for the three-month horizon, and
12 ﬁrms for the six-month horizon. These authors do not report results by industry group.
28major shortcomings. First, following Holden and Peel (1990), they are misspeciﬁed as un-
biasedness tests, because rejection of the (0,1) restriction on the slope and intercept is a
suﬃcient, not a necessary, condition for unbiasedness. Only a zero restriction on the inter-
cept in a regression of the forecast error on a constant is both necessary and suﬃcient for
unbiasedness. Second, tests using the bivariate speciﬁcation suﬀer from a lack of power. Yet,
this is exactly what we would expect in an asset market whose price is a near random walk:
the forecasted change is nearly unrelated to (and varies much less than) the actual change.
In contrast, we conduct pretests for rationality based on determining whether the realiza-
tion and forecast are each integrated and cointegrated. In this case, following Liu and Maddala
(1992), a “restricted” cointegration test, which imposes a (0,1) restriction on the cointegrat-
ing vector, is necessary for testing unbiasedness. (We show that the Holden and Peel (1990)
critique does not apply if the regressor and regressand are cointegrated.) If a unit root in
the restricted residual is rejected, then the univariate test which regresses the forecast error
on a constant is equivalent to the restricted cointegration test. Testing this regression for
white noise residuals is one type of weak eﬃciency test. Testing other stationary regressors
in the information set for zero coeﬃcients produces additional eﬃciency tests.
In the univariate speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd that, for each group, the ability to produce un-
biased forecasts deteriorates with horizon length: no group rejects unbiasedness at the one-
month horizon, but all groups reject at the six-month horizon, because the forecast errors
are nonstationary. Exporters consistently perform worse than the other industry groups,
with a tendency toward depreciation bias. Using only two years of data, Ito (1990) found
the same result for exporters, which he described a a type of “wishful thinking.”
The unbiasedness results are almost entirely reversed when we test the hypothesis using
the conventional bivariate speciﬁcation. That is, the joint hypothesis of zero intercept and
unit slope is rejected for all groups at the one-month horizon, but only for exporters and
the three- and six-month horizons. Thus, in stark contrast to the univariate unbiasedness
29tests, as well as Ito’s (1990) bivariate tests, forecast performance does not deteriorate with
increases in the horizon.
Also, since Engle and Granger (1987) have showed that cointegrated variables have an
error correction representation, we impose joint “unbiasedness” restrictions ﬁrst used by
Hakkio and Rush (1989) on the ECM. However, we show that these restrictions also repre-
sent suﬃcient, not necessary, conditions, so these tests could tend to over-reject. We then
develop and test restrictions which are both necessary and suﬃcient conditions for unbiased-
ness. The test results conﬁrm that the greater rate of rejections of the joint ”unbiasedness”
restrictions in the ECM is caused by the failure of the implicit restriction of weak eﬃciency
with respect to the lagged forecast. When we impose the restriction that the coeﬃcient of the
forecast equals one, the ECM unbiasedness test results mimic those of the simple univariate
unbiasedness tests. For this dataset, at least, it does not appear that an ECM provides any
value added over the simple unbiasedness test. Furthermore, since the error correction term
is not statistically signiﬁcant in any regressions, it is unclear whether the ECM provides any
additional insight into the long-run adjustment mechanism of exchange rate changes.
The failure of more general forms of weak eﬃciency is borne out by two types of explicit
tests for weak eﬃciency. In the ﬁrst type, we regress the forecast error on single and cumula-
tive lags of mean forecast error, mean forecasted depreciation, and actual depreciation. We
ﬁnd many rejections of unbiasedness. In the second type, we use the Godfrey (1978) LM test
for serial correlation of order h through h+6 in the residuals of the forecast error regression.
Remarkably, all but one LM test at a speciﬁed lag length produces a rejection at less than a
10% level, with most at less than a 5% level. (As in the case of the univariate unbiasedness
test, all weak eﬃciency tests at the six-month horizon fail due to the nonstationarity of the
forecast error.)
Whereas Ito (1990) and Elliott and Ito (1999) measured diversity as a statistically sig-
niﬁcant deviation of an individual’s forecast from the cross-sectional average forecast, we
perform a separate test of micro-homogeneity for each type of rationality test–unbiasedness
30as well as weak eﬃciency–that we ﬁrst conducted at the industry level. In order to conduct
the systems estimation and testing required for the micro-homogeneity test, our GMM es-
timation and inference makes use of an innovative variance-covariance matrix that extends
the Keane and Runkle (1990) counterpart from a pooled to an SUR-type structure. Our
variance-covariance matrix takes into account not only serial correlation and heteroscedastic-
ity at the individual level (via a Newey-West-Bartlett correction), but also forecaster cross-
correlation up to h-1 lags. We document the statistical signiﬁcance of the cross-sectional
correlation using Pesaran’s (2004) CD test.
In the univariate unbiasedness tests, we ﬁnd that, irrespective of the ability to produce
unbiased forecasts at a given horizon, micro-homogeneity is rejected at virtually a 0% level
for all horizons. We ﬁnd this result to be somewhat counterintuitive, in light of our prior
belief that micro-homogeneity would be more likely to obtain if there were no rejections of
unbiasedness. Evidently, there is suﬃcient variation in the estimated bias coeﬃcient across
groups and/or high precision of these estimates to make the micro-homogeneity test quite
sensitive. Micro-homogeneity is also strongly rejected in the weak eﬃciency tests.
In contrast to the results with the univariate unbiasedness speciﬁcation, micro-homogeneity
is not rejected at any horizon in the bivariate regressions. We conjecture that the imprecise
estimation of the slope coeﬃcient makes it diﬃcult to reject joint hypotheses involving this
coeﬃcient.
In conclusion, we recommend that all rationality tests be undertaken using simple uni-
variate speciﬁcations at the outset (rather than only if the joint bivariate test is rejected, as
was suggested by Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969) and Holden and Peel (1990) and employed
by Gavin (2003)). Before conducting such rationality tests, one should test the restricted
cointegrated regression residuals, i.e., the forecast error, for stationarity. Clearly, integration
accounting and regression speciﬁcation matter for rationality testing.
While our rationality tests do not attempt to explain cross-sectional dispersion, the
widespread rejection of micro-homogeneity in diﬀerent speciﬁcations of unbiasedness and
31weak eﬃciency tests40 provide more motivation for the classiﬁcation of forecasters into types
(e.g., fundamentalist and chartist/noise traders) than for simply assuming a representative
agent (with rational expectations).
There are characteristics of forecasts other than rationality which are of intrinsic interest.
Given our various rejections of rational expectations, it is natural to explore what expecta-
tional mechanism the forecasters use. Ito (1994) tested the mean JCIF forecasts for extrap-
olative and regressive expectations, as well as a mixture of the two.41 Cohen and Bonham
(2006) extend this analysis using individual forecast generating processes and additional
speciﬁcations of learning models. In addition, much of the literature on survey forecasts has
analyzed the accuracy of predictions, typically ranking forecasters by MSE (raw or relative).
One relatively unexplored issue is the statistical signiﬁcance of the ranking, regardless of
loss function. However, other loss functions, especially nonsymmetric ones, are also reason-
able. For example, Elliott and Ito (1999) have ranked individual JCIF forecasters using a
proﬁtability criterion. As mentioned in section 2.2, the loss function may incorporate strate-
gic considerations that result in “rational bias.” Such an exploration would require more
disaggregated data than the JCIF industry forecasts to which we have access.
40We put less weight on the results of the weaker tests for micro-homogeneity in the bivariate regression
framework.
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Figure 8 Actual vs Expected Exchange
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Figure 10 Actual vs Expected Exchange































Figure 12 Actual & Expected Deprecia-
















Figure 13 Actual & Expected Depreciation, 6 Month-Ahead Forecast
36Table 1.1 Joint Unbiasedness Tests (1 month forecasts)
Individual regressions
st+h − st = αi,h + βi,h(se
i,t,h − st) + εi,t,h for h = 2 (2)
degrees of freedom = 260
i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4
Banks & Insurance & Export Life Ins. &
Brokers Trading Cos. Industries Import Cos.
αi,h -0.003 -0.004 -0.007 -0.006
t (NW) -1.123 -1.428 -2.732 -1.903
p-value 0.262 0.153 0.006 0.057
βi,h 0.437 0.289 -0.318 0.008
t (NW) 1.674 1.382 -1.237 -0.038
R2 0.014 0.008 0.007 0.000
H0 : βi,h = 1,for i = 1,2,3,4
χ2 4.666 4.666 4.666 4.666
p-value 0.031 0.001 0.000 0.000
Unbiasedness Tests: H0 : αi,h = 0,βi,h = 1, for i = 1,2,3,4
χ2(NW) 4.696 11.682 29.546 19.561
p-value 0.096 0.003 0.000 0.000
MH tests H0 : αi,h = αj,βi,h = βj for all i,j  = i
χ2(GMM) 9.689
p-value 0.138
37Table 1.2 Joint Unbiasedness Tests (3 month forecasts)
Individual regressions
st+h − st = αi,h + βi,h(se
i,t,h − st) + εi,t,h for h = 6 (2)
degrees of freedom = 256
i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4
Banks & Insurance & Export Life Ins. &
Brokers Trading Cos. Industries Import Cos.
αi,h -0.013 -0.011 -0.017 -0.014
t (NW) -1.537 -1.362 -2.060 -1.517
p-value 0.124 0.173 0.039 0.129
βi,h 0.521 0.611 0.082 0.484
t (NW) 1.268 1.868 0.215 1.231
R2 0.018 0.026 0.001 0.016
H0 : βi,h = 1,for i = 1,2,3,4
χ2 1.362 1.415 5.822 1.728
p-value 0.243 0.234 0.016 0.189
Unbiasedness Tests: H0 : αi,h = 0,βi,h = 1, for i = 1,2,3,4
χ2(NW) 2.946 2.691 11.156 3.023
p-value 0.229 0.260 0.004 0.221
MH tests H0 : αi,h = αj,βi,h = βj for all i,j  = i
χ2(GMM) 5.783
p-value 0.448
38Table 1.3 Joint Unbiasedness Tests (6 month forecasts)
Individual regressions
st+h − st = αi,h + βi,h(se
i,t,h − st) + εi,t,h for h = 12 (2)
degrees of freedom = 256
i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4
Banks & Insurance & Export Life Ins. &
Brokers Trading Cos. Industries Import Cos.
αi,h -0.032 -0.032 -0.039 -0.034
t (NW) -1.879 -1.831 -2.099 -1.957
p-value 0.060 0.067 0.036 0.050
βi,h 0.413 0.822 0.460 0.399
t (NW) 0.761 1.529 0.911 -0.168
R2 0.01 0.044 0.021 0.012
H0 : βi,h = 1,for i = 1,2,3,4
χ2 1.166 0.110 1.147 1.564
p-value 0.280 0.740 0.284 0.211
Unbiasedness Tests: H0 : αi,h = 0,βi,h = 1, for i = 1,2,3,4
χ2(NW) 4.332 3.5 7.899 5.006
p-value 0.115 0.174 0.019 0.082
MH tests H0 : αi,h = αj,βi,h = βj for all i,j  = i
χ2(GMM) 7.071
p-value 0.314
39Table 2.1 Unit Root Tests (1 Month Forecasts h = 2)
∆yt = α + βyt−1 + γt +
 p
k=1 θt∆yt−k + ǫt for h = 2 (5)
Lags ADF t test ADF z test Joint test
Log of spot rate (n=276) 0 -2.828 -9.660 6.820**
Hth diﬀerence of log of spot rate 12 -4.306*** -167.473*** 9.311***
Group 1 Banks & Brokers
Log of forecast 0 -2.274* -5.072 6.327**
Hth diﬀerence of log of forecast 0 -7.752*** -96.639*** 30.085***
Forecast error
Restriced CI eq. 1 -11.325*** -249.389*** 64.676***
Unrestriced CI eq. 1 65.581***
Group 2 Insurance & Trading Cos.
Log of forecast 0 -2.735* -5.149 6.705***
Hth diﬀerence of log of forecast 0 -7.895*** -94.986*** 31.252***
Forecast error
Restriced CI eq. 1 -11.624*** -270.302*** 68.053***
Unrestriced CI eq. 1 -11.750***
Group 3 Export Industries
Log of forecast 1 -2.372 -4.806 5.045**
Hth diﬀerence of log of forecast 0 -8.346*** -111.632*** 34.889***
Forecast error
Restriced CI eq. 1 -10.324*** -211.475*** 53.757***
Unrestriced CI eq. 1 -10.392***
Group 4 Life Ins. & Import Cos.
Log of forecast 0 -2.726* -5.009 6.438**
Hth diﬀerence of log of forecast 1 -5.216*** -52.911*** 3.630***
Forecast error
Restriced CI eq. 1 -10.977*** -231.837*** 60.820***
Unrestriced CI eq. 1 -10.979***
* rejection at 10% level
** rejection at 5% level
*** rejection at 1% level
40Table 2.2 Unit Root Tests (3 Month Forecasts h = 6)
∆yt = α + βyt−1 + γt +
 p
k=1 θt∆yt−k + ǫt for h = 6 (5)
Lags ADF t test ADF z test Joint test
Log of spot rate (n=276) 0 -2.828 -9.660 6.820**
Hth diﬀerence of log of spot rate 2 -4.760*** -49.769*** 11.351***
Group 1 Banks & Brokers
Log of forecast 0 -2.840* -4.852 7.610***
Hth diﬀerence of log of forecast 0 -5.092*** -48.707*** 12.990***
Forecast error
Restriced CI eq. 6 -3.022** -29.429*** 4.673**
Unrestriced CI eq. 6 -3.343*
Group 2 Insurance & Trading Cos.
Log of forecast 0 -2.778* -4.533 8.858***
Hth diﬀerence of log of forecast 0 -6.514*** -71.931*** 21.588***
Forecast error
Restriced CI eq. 6 -3.068** -31.038*** 4.956**
Unrestriced CI eq. 2 -4.539***
Group 3 Export Industries
Log of forecast 0 -3.105** -4.549 9.090***
Hth diﬀerence of log of forecast 1 -4.677*** -41.524*** 10.944***
Forecast error
Restriced CI eq. 6 -3.317** -31.207*** 5.659**
Unrestriced CI eq. 5 -5.115***
Group 4 Life Ins. & Import Cos.
Log of forecast 0 -2.863* -4.400 8.161***
Hth diﬀerence of log of forecast 1 -4.324*** -39.870*** 9.352***
Forecast error
Restriced CI eq. 5 -4.825*** -118.586*** 11.679***
Unrestriced CI eq. 4 -5.123***
* rejection at 10% level
** rejection at 5% level
*** rejection at 1% level
41Table 2.3 Unit Root Tests (6 Month Forecasts h = 12)
∆yt = α + βyt−1 + γt +
 p
k=1 θt∆yt−k + ǫt for h = 12 (5)
Lags ADF t test ADF z test Joint test
Log of spot rate (n=276) 0 -2.828 -9.660 6.820**
Hth diﬀerence of log of spot rate 17 -3.189** -26.210*** 5.500**
Group 1 Banks & Brokers
Log of forecast 0 -2.947** -4.254 9.131***
Hth diﬀerence of log of forecast 0 -4.772*** -44.018*** 11.389***
Forecast error
Restriced CI eq. 1 -2.373 -13.577* 2.947
Unrestriced CI eq. 7 -3.285**
Group 2 Insurance & Trading Cos.
Log of forecast 0 -2.933** -4.004 9.531***
Hth diﬀerence of log of forecast 0 -6.007*** -64.923*** 18.044***
Forecast error
Restriced CI eq. 1 -2.114 -11.464* 2.399
Unrestriced CI eq. 1 -2.684*
Group 3 Export Industries
Log of forecast 0 -3.246** -4.059 10.704***
Hth diﬀerence of log of forecast 12 -4.961*** -44.532*** 12.331***
Forecast error
Restriced CI eq. 12 -1.515 -5.601 1.466
Unrestriced CI eq. 0 -2.931
Group 4 Life Ins. & Import Cos.
Log of forecast 0 -3.133** -4.196 9.549***
Hth diﬀerence of log of forecast 0 -4.795*** -44.062*** 11.537***
Forecast error
Restriced CI eq. 2 -2.508 -14.535** 3.148
Unrestriced CI eq. 1 -2.851*
* rejection at 10% level
** rejection at 5% level
*** rejection at 1% level
42Table 3.1 Simple Unbiasedness Tests (1 month forecasts)
Individual regresions (h=2): st+h − se
i,t,h = αi,h + εi,t,h (7)
degrees of freedom = 261
i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4
Banks & Insurance & Export Life Ins. &
Brokers Trading Cos. Industries Import Cos.
αi,h 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.002
t (NW) 0.115 0.524 -0.809 0.720
p-value 0.909 0.600 0.418 0.472
MH tests H0 : αi,h = αj,for all i,j  = i
χ2(GMM) 41.643 p-value 0.000
Individual regresions (h=2): st+h − se
i,t,h = αi,h,1 + αi,h,2 + αi,h,3 + αi,h,4 + εi,t,h (?)
i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4
Banks & Insurance & Export Life Ins. &
1985:05:29 - 1988.03:16 Brokers Trading Cos. Industries Import Cos.
αi,h,1 -0.007 -0.005 -0.013 -0.003
p-value 0.213 0.353 0.017 0.573
1988:03:30 - 1991:01:16
αi,h,2 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.010
p-value 0.134 0.164 0.090 0.114
1991:01:29 - 1993:11:16
αi,h,3 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001
p-value 0.598 0.810 0.374 0.757
1993:11:30 - 1996:10:15
αi,h,4 0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.003
p-value 0.675 0.433 0.814 0.519
Structrual Break tests H0 : αi,h,1 = αi,h,2 =     = αi,h,4
χ2 4.245 3.267 8.425 2.946
p-value 0.236 0.352 0.038 0.400
43Table 3.2 Simple Unbiasedness Tests (3 month forecasts)
Individual regresions (h=6): st+h − se
i,t,h = αi,h + εi,t,h (7)
degrees of freedom = 257
i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4
Banks & Insurance & Export Life Ins. &
Brokers Trading Cos. Industries Import Cos.
αi,h -0.01 -0.008 -0.019 -0.01
t (NW) -1.151 -0.929 -2.165 -1.121
p-value 0.25 0.353 0.03 0.262
MH tests H0 : αi,h = αj,for all i,j  = i
χ2(GMM) 40.16 p-value 0.000
Individual regresions (h=6): st+h − se
i,t,h = αi,h,1 + αi,h,2 + αi,h,3 + αi,h,4 + εi,t,h (?)
i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4
Banks & Insurance & Export Life Ins. &
1985:05:29 - 1988.02:24 Brokers Trading Cos. Industries Import Cos.
αi,h,1 -0.040 -0.039 -0.057 -0.039
p-value 0.005 0.007 0.000 0.008
1988:03:16 - 1990:12:11
αi,h,2 0.023 0.025 0.022 0.021
p-value 0.169 0.111 0.187 0.229
1990:12:25 - 1993:09:28
αi,h,3 -0.020 -0.018 -0.029 -0.020
p-value 0.064 0.125 0.023 0.094
1993:10:12 - 1996:0730
αi,h,4 0.000 0.001 -0.013 0.001
p-value 0.994 0.941 0.466 0.970
Structrual Break tests H0 : αi,h,1 = αi,h,2 =     = αi,h,4
χ2 9.319 9.925 13.291 7.987
p-value 0.025 0.019 0.004 0.046
44Table 4.1 Error Correction Models (1 Month Forecasts)
Group 1 Banks & Brokers
st+h − st = ci + αi(st − γise
i,t−h,h) + βi(se
i,t − se
i,t−h,h) + ǫi,h (9)
χ2 tests of ECM with robust standard errors (R2 = 0.0195)
Coeﬀ χ2(n) n p-value
constant -0.002 0.377 1 0.539
αi,h = 0 -0.465 2.884 1 0.089
αi,h = −1 -0.465 3.813 1 0.051
βi,h = 1 0.491 3.847 1 0.050
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 & βi,h = 1 3.910 3 0.271
F tests of ECM with whitened residuals (R2 = 0.605)
constant -0.001 0.238 1 0.627
αi,h = −1 -0.025 14.696 1 0.000
βi,h = 1 0.453 4.895 1 0.028
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 & βi,h = 1 6.790 3 0.000
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 & βi,h = 1 & 51.115 12 0.000
coeﬀs on all lags of realizations & forecasts = 0
st+h − se
i,t,h = di + (1 + αi,h)(st − se
i,t−h,h) (10)
χ2 tests with robust standard errors and βi,h = 1 imposed
constant 0.002 0.293 1 0.582
αi,h = −1 -0.991 0.015 1 0.903
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 0.294 2 0.863
Group 2 Insurance & Trading Cos.
st+h − st = ci + αi(st − γise
i,t−h,h) + βi(se
i,t − se
i,t−h,h) + ǫi,h (9)
χ2 tests of ECM with robust standard errors (R2 = 0.009)
Coeﬀ χ2(n) n p-value
constant -0.003 1.168 1 0.280
αi,h = 0 -0.262 1.111 1 0.292
αi,h = −1 -0.262 8.807 1 0.003
βi,h = 1 0.278 10.703 1 0.001
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 & βi,h = 1 10.965 3 0.012
F tests of ECM with whitened residuals (R2 = 0.596)
constant -0.002 0.563 1 0.454
αi,h = −1 -0.036 13.614 1 0.000
βi,h = 1 0.207 12.639 1 0.001
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 & βi,h = 1 6.792 3 0.000
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 & βi,h = 1 & 54.557 11 0.000
coeﬀs on all lags of realizations & forecasts = 0
st+h − se
i,t,h = di + (1 + αi,h)(st − se
i,t−h,h) (10)
χ2 tests with robust standard errors and βi,h = 1 imposed
constant 0.003 0.787 1 0.3751
αi,h = −1 -1.026 0.113 1 0.7368
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 1.052 2 0.591
45Table 4.2 Error Correction Models (1 Month Forecasts)
Group 3 Export Industries
st+h − st = ci + αi(st − γise
i,t−h,h) + βi(se
i,t − se
i,t−h,h) + ǫi,h (9)
χ2 tests of ECM with robust standard errors (R2 = 0.009)
Coeﬀ χ2(n) n p-value
constant -0.006 4.202 1 0.040
αi,h = 0 0.305 1.335 1 0.248
αi,h = −1 0.305 24.402 1 0.000
βi,h = 1 -0.256 20.516 1 0.000
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 & βi,h = 1 27.207 3 0.000
F tests of ECM with whitened residuals (R2 = 0.602)
constant -0.002 0.632 1 0.428
αi,h = −1 0.107 18.043 1 0.000
βi,h = 1 -0.055 17.987 1 0.000
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 & βi,h = 1 8.455 3 0.000
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 & βi,h = 1 & 55.054 10 0.000
coeﬀs on all lags of realizations & forecasts = 0
st+h − se
i,t,h = di + (1 + αi,h)(st − se
i,t−h,h) (10)
χ2 tests with robust standard errors and βi,h = 1 imposed
constant -0.001 0.082 1 0.7749
αi,h = −1 -0.887 2.321 1 0.1277
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 2.578 2 0.276
Group 4 Life Insurance & Import Cos.
st+h − st = ci + αi(st − γise
i,t−h,h) + βi(se
i,t − se
i,t−h,h) + ǫi,h (9)
χ2 tests of ECM with robust standard errors (R2 = 0.003)
Coeﬀ χ2(n) n p-value
constant -0.004 1.734 1 0.188
αi,h = 0 -0.066 0.083 1 0.773
αi,h = −1 -0.066 16.501 1 0.000
βi,h = 1 0.112 16.086 1 0.000
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 & βi,h = 1 17.071 3 0.001
F tests of ECM with whitened residuals (R2 = 0.607)
constant -0.002 0.392 1 0.532
αi,h = −1 -0.026 20.268 1 0.000
βi,h = 1 0.226 12.020 1 0.001
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 & βi,h = 1 10.794 3 0.000
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 & βi,h = 1 & 57.702 11 0.000
coeﬀs on all lags of realizations & forecasts = 0
st+h − se
i,t,h = di + (1 + αi,h)(st − se
i,t−h,h) (10)
χ2 tests with robust standard errors and βi,h = 1 imposed
constant 0.003 1.254 1 0.2629
αi,h = −1 -0.949 0.481 1 0.4879
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 1.628 2 0.443
46Table 4.3 Error Correction Models (3 Month Forecasts)
Group 1 Banks & Brokers
st+h − st = ci + αi(st − γise
i,t−h,h) + βi(se
i,t − se
i,t−h,h) + ǫi,h (9)
χ2 tests of ECM with robust standard errors (R2 = 0.036)
Coeﬀ χ2(n) n p-value
constant -0.010 1.306 1 0.253
αi,h = 0 -0.377 0.590 1 0.443
αi,h = −1 -0.377 1.604 1 0.205
βi,h = 1 0.501 1.268 1 0.260
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 & βi,h = 1 2.348 3 0.503
F tests of ECM with whitened residuals (R2 = 0.863)
constant -0.008 4.173 1 0.044
αi,h = −1 0.233 56.755 1 0.000
βi,h = 1 -0.178 51.113 1 0.000
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 & βi,h = 1 28.974 3 0.000
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 & βi,h = 1 & 121.851 14 0.000
coeﬀs on all lags of realizations & forecasts = 0
st+h − se
i,t,h = di + (1 + αi,h)(st − se
i,t−h,h) (10)
χ2 tests with robust standard errors and βi,h = 1 imposed
constant -0.006 0.556 1 0.456
αi,h = −1 -0.889 0.896 1 0.344
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 1.330 2 0.514
Group 2 Insurance & Trading Cos.
st+h − st = ci + αi(st − γise
i,t−h,h) + βi(se
i,t − se
i,t−h,h) + ǫi,h (9)
χ2 tests of ECM with robust standard errors (R2 = 0.044)
Coeﬀ χ2(n) n p-value
constant -0.008 0.874 1 0.350
αi,h = 0 -0.556 2.061 1 0.151
αi,h = −1 -0.556 1.310 1 0.252
βi,h = 1 0.663 0.965 1 0.326
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 & βi,h = 1 1.833 3 0.608
F tests of ECM with whitened residuals (R2 = 0.844)
constant -0.005 1.400 1 0.239
αi,h = −1 0.080 31.425 1 0.000
βi,h = 1 -0.167 40.346 1 0.000
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 & βi,h = 1 23.551 3 0.000
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 & βi,h = 1 & 148.338 10 0.000
coeﬀs on all lags of realizations & forecasts = 0
st+h − se
i,t,h = di + (1 + αi,h)(st − se
i,t−h,h) (10)
χ2 tests with robust standard errors and βi,h = 1 imposed
constant -0.005 0.291 1 0.589
αi,h = −1 -0.897 0.773 1 0.379
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 0.945 2 0.623
47Table 4.4 Error Correction Models (3 Month Forecasts)
Group 3 Export Industries




χ2 tests of ECM with robust standard errors (R2 = 0.026)
Coeﬀ χ2(n) n p-value
constant -0.013 2.303 0 0.129
αi,h = 0 -0.253 0.393 1 0.531
αi,h = −1 -0.253 3.422 1 0.064
βi,h = 1 0.411 2.102 1 0.147
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 & βi,h = 1 7.663 3 0.054
F tests of ECM with whitened residuals (R2 = 0.856)
constant -0.003 0.840 1 0.361
αi,h = −1 -0.006 29.512 1 0.000
βi,h = 1 -0.205 40.582 1 0.000
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 & βi,h = 1 16.290 3 0.000
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 & βi,h = 1 & 182.912 10 0.000
coeﬀs on all lags of realizations & forecasts = 0
st+h − se
i,t,h = di + (1 + αi,h)(st − se
i,t−h,h) (10)
χ2 tests with robust standard errors and βi,h = 1 imposed
constant -0.012 1.971 1 0.160
αi,h = −1 -0.775 3.791 1 0.052
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 6.337 2 0.042
Group 4 Life Insurance & Import Cos.




χ2 tests of ECM with robust standard errors (R2 = 0.038)
Coeﬀ χ2(n) n p-value
constant -0.009 0.993 1 0.319
αi,h = 0 -0.478 1.250 1 0.264
αi,h = −1 -0.478 1.488 1 0.223
βi,h = 1 0.604 0.919 1 0.338
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 & βi,h = 1 2.451 3 0.484
F tests of ECM with whitened residuals (R2 = 0.845)
constant -0.003 0.510 1 0.477
αi,h = −1 0.050 32.000 1 0.000
βi,h = 1 0.062 32.469 1 0.000
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 & βi,h = 1 21.673 3 0.000
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 & βi,h = 1 & 169.286 9 0.000
coeﬀs on all lags of realizations & forecasts = 0
st+h − se
i,t,h = di + (1 + αi,h)(st − se
i,t−h,h) (10)
χ2 tests with robust standard errors and βi,h = 1 imposed
constant -0.006 0.455 1 0.500
αi,h = −1 -0.865 1.405 1 0.236
constant = 0 & αi,h = −1 1.726 2 0.422
48Table 5.1 Weak Efficiency Tests (1 Month Forecasts)
st+h − se
i,t,h = αi,h +
 h+6
p=h βi,t+h−p(st+h−p − se
m,t+h−p,h) + ǫi,t,h for h = 2 (11)
i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4
Banks & Insurance & Export Life Ins. &
Brokers Trading Cos. Industry Import Cos.
Lags χ2 p-value χ2 p-value χ2 p-value χ2 p-value
Single
2 0.132 0.895 0.139 0.709 1.871 0.171 0.334 0.563
3 -0.914 0.361 1.971 0.160 0.027 0.869 0.186 0.667
4 0.160 0.689 0.006 0.938 1.634 0.201 0.714 0.398
5 0.450 0.502 0.050 0.823 1.749 0.186 1.180 0.277
6 0.046 0.831 0.104 0.747 0.686 0.408 0.188 0.665
7 0.002 0.967 0.282 0.595 0.069 0.793 0.001 0.970
8 0.091 0.763 0.436 0.509 0.022 0.883 0.300 0.584
Cum.
3 0.765 0.682 1.778 0.411 1.746 0.418 0.585 0.746
4 4.626 0.201 3.463 0.326 8.763 0.033 5.349 0.148
5 4.747 0.314 4.382 0.357 7.680 0.104 5.081 0.279
6 5.501 0.358 5.592 0.348 7.652 0.176 5.768 0.329
7 6.252 0.396 6.065 0.416 8.879 0.180 6.677 0.352
8 5.927 0.548 5.357 0.617 8.390 0.299 6.087 0.530
Selected micro-homogeneity tests
H0 : αi,h = αj,h,βi,t+h−p = βj,t+h−p for all i,j  = i
χ2(n) p-value n
Single
2 122.522 0.000 6
8 43.338 0.000 6
Cum.
3 136.830 0.000 9
8 201.935 0.000 24
VCV matrix incorporates Newey-West correction for serial correlation
χ2 statistics for mean forecast error regressions (p-value underneath)
Degrees of freedom (n) represent number of regressors, excluding intercept
(n=1 for single lag, n=max. lag -2 for cumulative lags)
49Table 5.2 Weak Efficiency Tests (1 Month Forecasts)
st+h − se
i,t,h = αi,h +
 h+6
p=h βi,t+h−p(se
m,t+h−p,h − st−p) + ǫi,t,h for h = 2 (12)
i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4
Banks & Insurance & Export Life Ins. &
Brokers Trading Cos. Industry Import Cos.
Lags χ2 p-value χ2 p-value χ2 p-value χ2 p-value
Single
2 -2.325 0.020 5.641 0.018 3.658 0.056 7.011 0.008
3 4.482 0.106 3.519 0.061 3.379 0.066 5.877 0.015
4 3.162 0.075 2.580 0.108 2.805 0.094 4.911 0.027
5 3.956 0.047 2.993 0.084 3.102 0.078 7.467 0.006
6 6.368 0.012 4.830 0.028 5.952 0.015 9.766 0.002
7 8.769 0.003 6.786 0.009 7.755 0.005 12.502 0.000
8 5.451 0.020 4.114 0.043 4.417 0.036 7.564 0.006
Cum.
3 5.592 0.061 6.138 0.046 4.116 0.128 7.508 0.023
4 5.638 0.131 5.896 0.117 4.283 0.232 7.888 0.048
5 5.189 0.268 4.964 0.291 3.784 0.436 8.009 0.091
6 6.025 0.304 5.068 0.408 4.847 0.435 8.401 0.136
7 7.044 0.317 5.746 0.452 5.940 0.430 9.434 0.151
8 10.093 0.183 8.494 0.291 7.919 0.340 12.530 0.084
Selected micro-homogeneity tests
H0 : αi,h = αj,h,βi,t+h−p = βj,t+h−p for all i,j  = i
χ2(n) p-value n
Single
2 40.462 0.000 6
8 30.739 0.000 6
Cum.
3 42.047 0.000 6
8 46.124 0.004 24
VCV matrix incorporates Newey-West correction for serial correlation
χ2 statistics for mean forecast error regressions (p-value underneath)
Degrees of freedom (n) represent number of regressors, excluding intercept
(n=1 for single lag, n=max. lag -2 for cumulative lags)
50Table 5.3 Weak Efficiency Tests (1 Month Forecasts)
st+h − se
i,t,h = αi,h +
 h+6
p=h βi,t+h−p(st+h−p − st−p) + ǫi,t,h for h = 2 (13)
i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4
Banks & Insurance & Export Life Ins. &
Brokers Trading Cos. Industry Import Cos.
Lags χ2 p-value χ2 p-value χ2 p-value χ2 p-value
Single
2 -0.328 0.743 0.639 0.424 1.249 0.264 0.023 0.879
3 1.621 0.203 3.060 0.080 0.000 0.993 0.550 0.458
4 0.002 0.964 0.335 0.562 0.819 0.366 0.146 0.702
5 0.086 0.770 0.042 0.837 1.001 0.317 0.344 0.557
6 0.165 0.685 0.916 0.339 0.029 0.864 0.095 0.758
7 0.850 0.357 1.861 0.172 0.329 0.566 1.152 0.283
8 0.597 0.440 1.088 0.297 0.317 0.574 1.280 0.258
Cum.
3 1.978 0.372 3.169 0.205 1.940 0.379 1.132 0.568
4 3.304 0.347 3.501 0.321 5.567 0.135 3.318 0.345
5 3.781 0.436 4.248 0.373 5.806 0.214 3.598 0.463
6 3.651 0.601 4.646 0.461 5.756 0.331 3.819 0.576
7 4.493 0.610 5.609 0.468 6.608 0.359 5.040 0.539
8 5.619 0.585 6.907 0.439 7.907 0.341 6.521 0.480
Selected micro-homogeneity tests
H0 : αi,h = αj,h,βi,t+h−p = βj,t+h−p for all i,j  = i
χ2(n) p-value n
Single
2 150.698 0.000 6
8 45.652 0.000 6
Cum.
3 161.950 0.000 9
8 214.970 0.000 24
VCV matrix incorporates Newey-West correction for serial correlation
χ2 statistics for mean forecast error regressions (p-value underneath)
Degrees of freedom (n) represent number of regressors, excluding intercept
(n=1 for single lag, n=max. lag -2 for cumulative lags)
51Table 5.4 LM Test for Serial Correlation (1 Month Forecasts)
H0 : βi,t−h = ... = βi,t−h−6 = 0, for h = 2
in ˆ ǫi,t,h = αi,h +
 h−1
k=1 βi,k(st+h−k − se
i,t−k,h) +
 h+6
l=h φi,lˆ ǫi,t−l,h + ηi,t,h,
where ǫ is generated from
st+h − se
i,t,h = αi,h +
 h−1
k=1 βi,k(st+h−k − se
i,t−k,h) + ǫi,t,h
Cum. lags (k) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
n − k 219 205 192 179 166 153 144
i = 1
Banks & Brokers
F(k,n − k) 29.415 18.339 14.264 11.180 9.699 7.922 6.640
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
i = 2
Insurance & Trading Cos.
F(k,n − k) 30.952 19.506 15.372 11.661 9.695 8.120 7.050
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
i = 3
Export Industries
F(k,n − k) 32.387 20.691 16.053 12.951 10.628 9.418 7.520
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
i = 4
Life Ins. & Import Cos.
F(k,n − k) 29.694 18.606 14.596 11.093 9.586 9.154 7.937
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
52Table 5.5 Weak Efficiency Tests (3 Month Forecasts)
st+h − se
i,t,h = αi,h +
 h+6
p=h βi,t+h−p(st+h−p − se
m,t+h−p,h) + ǫi,t,h for h = 6 (11)
i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4
Banks & Insurance & Export Life Ins. &
Brokers Trading Cos. Industry Import Cos.
Lags χ2 p-value χ2 p-value χ2 p-value χ2 p-value
Single
6 0.667 0.414 0.954 0.329 4.493 0.034 1.719 0.190
7 0.052 0.820 0.071 0.789 1.434 0.231 0.268 0.605
8 0.006 0.940 0.010 0.921 0.382 0.537 0.001 0.976
9 0.055 0.814 0.043 0.836 0.140 0.708 0.060 0.806
10 0.264 0.607 0.278 0.598 0.001 0.980 0.432 0.511
11 0.299 0.585 0.381 0.537 0.020 0.888 0.598 0.439
12 0.172 0.678 0.336 0.562 0.011 0.918 0.633 0.426
Cum.
7 8.966 0.011 11.915 0.003 19.663 0.000 12.350 0.002
8 12.288 0.006 16.263 0.001 23.290 0.000 15.146 0.002
9 11.496 0.022 15.528 0.004 22.417 0.000 14.778 0.005
10 8.382 0.136 12.136 0.033 16.839 0.005 12.014 0.035
11 11.596 0.072 18.128 0.006 23.782 0.001 15.330 0.032
12 11.527 0.117 15.983 0.025 21.626 0.003 13.038 0.071
Selected micro-homogeneity tests
H0 : αi,h = αj,h,βi,t+h−p = βj,t+h−p for all i,j  = i
χ2(n) p-value n
Single
6 188.738 0.000 6
12 63.364 0.000 6
Cum.
7 217.574 0.000 9
12 229.567 0.000 24
VCV matrix incorporates Newey-West correction for serial correlation
χ2 statistics for mean forecast error regressions (p-value underneath)
Degrees of freedom (n) represent number of regressors, excluding intercept
(n=1 for single lag, n=max. lag -2 for cumulative lags)
53Table 5.6 Weak Efficiency Tests (3 Month Forecasts)
st+h − se
i,t,h = αi,h +
 h+6
p=h βi,t+h−p(se
m,t+h−p,h − st−p) + ǫi,t,h for h = 6 (12)
i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4
Banks & Insurance & Export Life Ins. &
Brokers Trading Cos. Industry Import Cos.
Lags χ2 p-value χ2 p-value χ2 p-value χ2 p-value
Single
6 3.457 0.063 2.947 0.086 3.470 0.062 3.681 0.055
7 4.241 0.039 3.834 0.050 4.390 0.036 4.370 0.037
8 5.748 0.017 5.177 0.023 5.410 0.020 6.053 0.014
9 6.073 0.014 5.843 0.016 5.968 0.015 6.474 0.011
10 8.128 0.004 7.868 0.005 7.845 0.005 8.521 0.004
11 8.511 0.004 8.004 0.005 8.308 0.004 8.429 0.004
12 6.275 0.012 6.691 0.010 6.635 0.010 6.079 0.014
Cum.
7 4.717 0.095 4.985 0.083 4.954 0.084 4.928 0.085
8 5.733 0.125 5.209 0.157 5.045 0.168 6.736 0.081
9 5.195 0.268 5.411 0.248 5.112 0.276 6.053 0.195
10 7.333 0.197 9.245 0.100 9.456 0.092 7.872 0.163
11 8.539 0.201 6.658 0.354 7.488 0.278 7.955 0.241
12 8.758 0.271 6.747 0.456 7.796 0.351 8.698 0.275
Selected micro-homogeneity tests
H0 : αi,h = αj,h,βi,t+h−p = βj,t+h−p for all i,j  = i
χ2(n) p-value n
Single
6 57.130 0.000 6
12 58.230 0.000 6
Cum.
7 63.917 0.000 9
12 126.560 0.000 24
VCV matrix incorporates Newey-West correction for serial correlation
χ2 statistics for mean forecast error regressions (p-value underneath)
Degrees of freedom (n) represent number of regressors, excluding intercept
(n=1 for single lag, n=max. lag -2 for cumulative lags)
54Table 5.7 Weak Efficiency Tests (3 Month Forecasts)
st+h − se
i,t,h = αi,h +
 h+6
p=h βi,t+h−p(st+h−p − st−p) + ǫi,t,h for h = 6 (13)
i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4
Banks & Insurance & Export Life Ins. &
Brokers Trading Cos. Industry Import Cos.
Lags χ2 p-value χ2 p-value χ2 p-value χ2 p-value
Single
6 0.268 0.604 0.450 0.502 3.657 0.056 1.065 0.302
7 0.055 0.814 0.037 0.848 0.599 0.439 0.003 0.957
8 0.331 0.565 0.305 0.581 0.029 0.864 0.230 0.632
9 0.513 0.474 0.482 0.488 0.022 0.883 0.577 0.448
10 1.038 0.308 1.077 0.299 0.318 0.573 1.344 0.246
11 1.335 0.248 1.532 0.216 0.563 0.453 1.872 0.171
12 1.184 0.276 1.620 0.203 0.616 0.433 1.979 0.159
Cum.
7 6.766 0.034 8.767 0.012 15.683 0.000 10.052 0.007
8 8.752 0.033 11.784 0.008 18.330 0.000 11.162 0.011
9 8.654 0.070 11.588 0.021 18.929 0.001 11.309 0.023
10 9.421 0.093 12.890 0.024 19.146 0.002 12.275 0.031
11 9.972 0.126 13.137 0.041 19.597 0.003 13.003 0.043
12 8.581 0.284 11.823 0.107 17.670 0.014 11.431 0.121
Selected micro-homogeneity tests
H0 : αi,h = αj,h,βi,t+h−p = βj,t+h−p for all i,j  = i
χ2(n) p-value n
Single
6 151.889 0.000 6
12 66.313 0.000 6
Cum.
7 164.216 0.000 9
12 193.021 0.000 24
VCV matrix incorporates Newey-West correction for serial correlation
χ2 statistics for mean forecast error regressions (p-value underneath)
Degrees of freedom (n) represent number of regressors, excluding intercept
(n=1 for single lag, n=max. lag -2 for cumulative lags)
55Table 5.8 LM Test for Serial Correlation (3 Month Forecasts)
H0 : βi,t−h = ... = βi,t−h−6 = 0, for h = 6
in ˆ ǫi,t,h = αi,h +
 h−1
k=1 βi,k(st+h−k − se
i,t−k,h) +
 h+6
l=h φi,lˆ ǫi,t−l,h + ηi,t,h,
where ǫ is generated from
st+h − se
i,t,h = αi,h +
 h−1
k=1 βi,k(st+h−k − se
i,t−k,h) + ǫi,t,h
Cum. lags (k) 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
n − k 126 117 108 99 94 89 84
i = 1
Banks & Brokers
F(k,n − k) 3.452 2.856 3.023 2.951 2.599 2.652 2.921
p-value 0.003 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.006 0.002
i = 2
Insurance & Trading Cos.
F(k,n − k) 3.499 2.850 3.408 2.907 2.492 2.584 2.341
p-value 0.003 0.009 0.002 0.004 0.011 0.007 0.012
i = 3
Export Industries
F(k,n − k) 4.687 3.956 4.409 3.572 2.928 2.819 2.605
p-value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.005
i = 4
Life Ins. & Import Cos.
F(k,n − k) 2.352 2.482 2.501 2.168 1.866 1.794 1.811
p-value 0.035 0.021 0.016 0.031 0.060 0.067 0.059
56Table 6.0 CD Tests for Contemporaneous Cross-Sectional
Dependendence of Forecast Errors
st+h − se
i,t,h = αi.h + ǫi,t,h (7)
Lag length CD p-value
1 month horizon
0 37.945 0.000























N = 24, T = 276, ˆ ρij is the sample correlation coeﬃcient
between forecasters i and j, i  = j .




m,t,h = (αi,h − αm) + (εi,t,h − εm,t) for h = 2
degrees of freedom = 263
i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4
Banks & Insurance & Export Life Ins. &
Brokers Trading Cos. Industries Import Cos.
αi,h 0 -0.001 0.003 -0.002
t (NW) 0.173 -2.316 5.471 -3.965
p-value 0.863 0.021 0 0
MH tests H0 : αi,h = αj,for alli,j  = I
χ2(GMM) 40.946
MSL(GMM) 0




m,t,h = (αi,h − αm) + (εi,t,h − εm,t) for h = 6
degrees of freedom = 263
i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4
Banks & Insurance & Export Life Ins. &
Brokers Trading Cos. Industries Import Cos.
αi,h -0.002 -0.003 0.008 -0.002
t (NW) -2.307 -3.986 5.903 -1.883
p-value 0.021 0 0 0.06
MH tests H0 : αi,h = αj,for alli,j  = I
χ2(GMM) 37.704
MSL(GMM) 0




m,t,h = (αi,h − αm) + (εi,t,h − εm,t) for h = 12
degrees of freedom = 263
i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4
Banks & Insurance & Export Life Ins. &
Brokers Trading Cos. Industries Import Cos.
αi,h -0.004 -0.003 0.01 0
t (NW) -3.52 -2.34 4.549 -0.392
p-value 0 0.019 0 0.695
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64Appendix 1: Testing Micro-homogeneity with Survey Forecasts
The null hypothesis of micro-homogeneity is that the slope and intercept coeﬃcients in the
equation of interest are equal across individuals. This paper considers the case of individual
unbiasedness regressions such as equation (2) in the text, repeated here for convenience.
st+h − st = αi,h + βi,h(se
i,t,h − st) + εi,t,h (A1.1)
and tests H0 : α1 = α2 = ... = αN, and β1 = β2 = ... = βN.
Stack all N individual regressions into the Seemingly Unrelated Regression system
S = Fθ + ε (A1.2)












Each Fi = [ιse
i,t,h] is a T ×2 matrix of ones and individual i’s forecasts, θ = [α1 β1 ...αN βN]′,
and ε is an NT × 1 vector of stacked residuals. The vector of restrictions, Rθ = r,
corresponding to the null hypothesis of micro-homogeneity is normally distributed, with
Rθ − r ∼ N[0,R(F
′F)−1F
′ΩF(F






1 0 −1 0 ... 0
0 1 0 −1 0
. . .
. . . 0 ... ... ... 0






and r is a 2(N − 1) × 1 vector of zeros. The corresponding Wald test statistic,
(Rˆ θ − r)′[R(F
′F)−1F
′ˆ ΩF(F
′F)−1R′](Rˆ θ − r), is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square
random variable with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions, 2(N − 1).
For most surveys, there are a large number of missing observations. Keane and Runkle
(1990), Davies and Lahiri (1995), Bonham and Cohen (1995, 2001), and to the best of our
knowledge all other papers which make use of pooled regressions in tests of the REH have
dealt with the missing observations using the same approach. The pooled or individual
regression is estimated by eliminating the missing data points in both the forecasts and
the realization. The regression residuals are then padded with zeros in place of missing
observations to allow for the calculation of own and cross-covariances. As a result, many
individual variances and cross-covariances are calculated with relatively few pairs of resid-
uals. These individual cross-covariances are then averaged. In Keane and Runkle (1990)
and Bonham and Cohen (1995, 2001) the assumption of 2(k + 1) second moments, which
are common to all forecasters, is made for analytical tractability and for increased reli-
ability. In contrast to the forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters used in
Keane and Runkle (1990) and Bonham and Cohen (1995, 2001), the JCIF data set contains
virtually no missing observations. As a result, it is possible to estimate each individual’s vari-
ance covariance matrix (and cross-covariance matrix) rather than average over all individual
variances and cross-covariance pairs as in the aforementioned papers.
65We assume that for each forecast group i,
E[εi,t,h εi,t,h] = σ2
i,0 for all i,t,
E[εi,t,h εi,t+k] = σ2
i,k for all i,t,k such that 0 < k ≤ h, (A1.5)
E[εi,t,h εi,t+k] = 0 for all i,t,k such that k > h,
Similarly, for each pair of forecasters i and j we assume
E[εi,t,h εj,t] = δi,j(0) ∀i,j,t,
E[εi,t,h εj,t+k] = δi,j(k) ∀i,j,t,k such that k  = 0, and −h ≤ k ≤ h. (A1.6)
E[εi,t,h εj,t+k] = 0 ∀i,j,t,k such that k > |h|.
Thus, each pair of forecasters has a diﬀerent T × T cross-covariance matrix,
Pi,j =

    
 

δi,j(0) δi,j(−1) ... δi,j(−h) 0
δi,j(1) δi,j(0) δi,j(−1) ... 0
. . . ... ... ... . . .
... δi,j(1) δi,j(0) δi,j(−1)
0 δi,j(h) ... δi,j(1) δi,j(0)





Finally, note that Pi,j  = Pj,i, rather P ′
i,j = Pj,i. The complete variance-covariance matrix,
denoted Ω, has dimension NT × NT, with matrices Qi on the main diagonal and Pi,j oﬀ
the diagonal.
The individual Qi, variance covariances matrices are calculated using the Newey and West
(1987) heteroscedasticity-consistent, MA(j) corrected form. The Pi,j matrices are estimated
in an analogous manner,
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